Libya's Future Amid a Potential US–Russia Rapprochement

Francesco Salesio Schiavi, Middle East Institute of Switzerland

More than three months into Donald Trump’s second term, speculation is mounting over how US–Russia relations might evolve—not least in the Middle East, where Moscow has entrenched itself militarily across Syria, Libya, and the Sahel. By veering between admiration for Vladimir Putin and public expressions of frustration, the Tycoon's early months in office have already marked a clear break from the previous administration’s more confrontational approach.

In this context, Libya—long treated as a peripheral concern in Washington—may emerge as a testing ground for this recalibrated dynamic. Under Biden, US policy toward Libya experienced a slow but noticeable reengagement. The bipartisan passage of the Libya Stabilization Act and the country’s designation as a priority under the Global Fragility Act signaled growing institutional focus. These efforts culminated in visits by CIA Director William Burns and AFRICOM officials to both Tripoli and Benghazi. Although motivated in part by regional counterterrorism objectives, the U.S. shift was also a response to Russia’s expanding military presence in eastern Libya and the broader instability triggered by Moscow’s redeployments from Syria.

What began as a Wagner Group expedition supporting General Khalifa Haftar’s 2019–20 offensive on Tripoli has since evolved. Russia’s strategic logic in Libya is threefold. First, control over airbases and coastal ports like Tobruk ensures access to the Mediterranean—particularly important as its naval posture in Syria has come under pressure. Second, Libya offers a staging ground to influence the Maghreb and the Sahel, where military juntas in Mali, Niger, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Chad have aligned themselves with Moscow. Third, it allows Russia to pressure NATO’s southern flank, projecting force just “two steps” from Italian shores.

Russia’s footprint in Libya has grown both deeper and more structured. By August 2024, an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 Russian personnel had been deployed in LNA territory, mainly under the aegis of the “Africa Corps” —Wagner’s direct heir and a formalized arm of Moscow’s expeditionary influence. These figures are likely about to rise. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024, indeed, Russia has redeployed significant military assets—personnel, aircraft, and logistics units—into bases controlled by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), especially in Brak al-Shati and the Maaten al-Sarra airbase near the Chadian and Sudanese borders, reportedly restored by Russian technicians with Haftar’s approval.

Russia’s growing presence in Libya is less about numbers than about visibility and control. Plausible deniability has all but disappeared, as Moscow assumes direct responsibility for its operations in the country. Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited eastern Libya at least five times in under a year, and two Russian destroyers docked at Tobruk Naval Base in mid-2024 under the pretext of training. Analysts believe these visits were, in fact, part of Moscow’s ongoing efforts to resupply artillery to the Libyan National Army (LNA) and prepare for broader strategic projection across North Africa and the Sahel.

When compared to Russia, the disparity in US involvement in Libya is striking. While Moscow has cultivated deep ties with General Haftar for several years, Washington only reinvigorated its Libya policy in Biden’s late mandate. Alarmed by Russia’s growing influence, US and NATO officials responded with a mix of military diplomacy and realpolitik. A May 2024 NATO experts' report on the Alliance's first official Southern Strategy recommended that cooperation with “non-accountable southern partners” should be considered, even without demanding adherence to Western liberal values.

This opened the door for Washington to engage Haftar more directly. In August and September 2024, AFRICOM commanders met with Haftar in Benghazi. One of them, the Pentagon official Celeste Wallander, praised the LNA for contributing to Libya’s security and expressed interest in closer cooperation to counter terrorism and "external threats." These diplomatic gestures were followed in early 2025 by an unusually visible show of force: two US B-52 “Stratofortress” bombers conducted training flights with Libyan air controllers near Sirte, involving both Haftar-aligned and Tripoli-based forces.

The military visits also sought to promote unity between rival Libyan factions and to underscore Washington’s intent to reestablish a stabilizing footprint. Notably, Saddam Haftar—the LNA Ground Forces Chief of Staff and the most politically ambitious of Haftar’s sons—has reportedly expressed openness to the US and visited Washington in 2024. However, his connection to a notorious LNA unit accused of war crimes – not to mention his parenthood – continues to undermine his credibility as a potential Western interlocutor.

The Trump administration took office just as Russia was redeploying forces from Syria to Libya. While it articulated no specific policy toward the country, it largely continued the efforts to try to reorient Haftar’s allegiances away from the Kremlin. This is even though Trump has sought to reengage with Putin in an attempt to settle the Ukraine war.

At first glance, Libya appears to be an emblematic case of renewed US-Russia rivalry. Yet, the Trump administration’s broader geopolitical recalibration complicates that picture. Trump has simultaneously empowered Russia in Ukraine, calling Putin’s actions there "understandable" while also expressing recent disillusionment –stating he is now "p*ssed off" with him. This ambivalence extends to the Middle East, where Trump has shown signs of reducing confrontational postures, particularly in Syria.

In Libya, however, Trump’s approach appears more hawkish, possibly due to the country’s strategic value. While Trump’s foreign policy prioritizes transactional gains and bilateral deals, Libya may be the exception where competition with Russia intensifies rather than cools. Unlike in Syria—where Israel, Russia, and even Turkey play overlapping roles that Trump may be willing to tolerate— Libya offers fewer buffers and poses more direct implications for NATO's security architecture.

Libya remains defined by fragmentation, dual executives and overlapping spheres of influence. General Haftar continues to maintain his long-standing ties with Moscow even as he signals openness to working with Washington. Thus, it is unlikely that Haftar will entirely sever those ties, particularly given Moscow’s sustained provision of training, assets, and military support. Moreover, Moscow has recently expanded its outreach beyond Haftar’s camp: in December 2024, it announced the reopening of its embassy in Tripoli, signaling growing diplomatic engagement with the Government of National Unity (GNU) under Abdulhamid Dbeibah.

At the same time, the renewed US engagement does not yet amount to a coherent strategy. While military exercises and high-level visits indicate greater interest, it remains unclear whether this signals a broader strategic shift or simply an episodic response to Russian expansion. Libya’s future trajectory will depend not only on external posturing but also on how internal actors leverage these rivalries to pursue their own agendas.

As Trump recalibrates his stance toward both Putin and regional policy, Libya might be where strategic ambiguity gives way to direct contestation—or where great power competition is reshaped by local actors' ability to hedge, stall, and manipulate. Either way, Libya’s evolving role in US-Russia dynamics demands more sustained attention from policymakers in Washington—and Brussels.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an independent Middle East analyst and consultant specialized in the international relations and security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf. His expertise includes military and diplomatic interventions by international actors in the MENA region, as well as in military technologies of some of the leading Middle Eastern actors in this sector. He is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS).