Strategic Patience: Why Israel Hasn’t Fully Engaged the Houthis

Ibrahim Jalal, Middle East Institute

Since October 2023, Yemen’s Houthi rebel movement, also known as Ansar Allah, has transformed into a Red Sea disruptor and southern distraction point for Israel. Enabled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), motivated by its “death to Israel … America” ideology, and operating under the posture of the fading “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthi rebels have pursued an asymmetric campaign, launching over 200 long-range ballistic missiles and 170 drones toward Israel, redefining the latter’s security environment.

For Israel, the Houthis have been a secondary priority—and a distraction. Israel has been focused on its regional wars with Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq, and the IRGC itself to reshape the balance of power and impose a new regional status quo. The Houthi file has been deferred, not ignored. Their time, to Israeli leadership, appears clearly marked, having incapacitated several adversaries; not because Houthi attacks were disruptive, but largely because they questioned Israel’s perceptions over strategic depth, threat direction, internal security, deterrence viability, and multi-layered defense capacity.

The Israeli-Houthi confrontation had at least three mutual phases. The first Houthi phase focused initially on Red Sea disruptions (i.e., capture of the vessel Galaxy Leader) and symbolic attacks into Israel to test the waters before the second phase pursued territorial strikes. On July 19, 2024, a Houthi drone attack killed an Israeli citizen in Tel Aviv, which triggered the first public Israeli attack in Yemen. The third Houthi phase targeted critical infrastructure, such as Ben Gurion Airport in May 2025, and renewed the “maritime blockade” on Israel’s Haifa port, demonstrating intent and capability to strike strategic depth and target Israeli-affiliated ships despite the Houthi ceasefire with the U.S.

As part of the psychological warfare effort, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree warned that Israel's main airport was "no longer safe for air travel." Combined, these attacks have put pressure on Israel’s multi-layered, integrated defense coverage—from Iron Dome and Arrow 2/3 to David’s Sling—increased the cost of maritime insurance, and raised the level of shipping risk to Eilat port.

Israel’s three-phased response mirrored gradual intensification, but the Houthis did not care if the former would destroy critical Yemeni infrastructure after observing Gaza flattened. The first Israeli waves in Yemen from July 2024 sought to restore deterrence by destroying civilian infrastructure such as Hodeidah ports, fuel storage facilities, and a power plant, killing and injuring more than 90 civilians, not Houthi fighters. Then-Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said: “The fire burning in Hodeidah is seen across the Middle East.” Amid unceasing Houthi attacks despite $1 billion in infrastructure loss, the second Israeli phase destroyed Sana’a Airport, its runways, and four civilian aircraft in May 2025, thus doubling logistics challenges for civilians and Houthis alike; the only air connection for civilians living in Houthi-held areas was neutralized.

In the same month, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz jointly threatened to target top Houthi leadership. In June 2025 came the third phase, mirroring an improvement in intelligence gathering and reach; Israel targeted a private, senior Houthi meeting location in Sana’a hours before the group hit Israel, signaling intent to disrupt command and control structures in the style of Hezbollah, if necessary, and its ability to simultaneously manage multi-front theatres: Iran and the Houthis.

Many then expected the Houthis to join Iran’s retaliation following the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure on June 22, which brought the Iranian-Israeli 12-day war to a fragile ceasefire. The Houthis, like the factions of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Front (PMF), did not officially join the retaliation for three reasons. First, the IRGC’s response to Israeli and U.S. strikes was deliberately calibrated to avoid escalating a war it cannot win nor survive. Therefore, the indirect proxy response was delayed. Although Iran was increasingly isolated and its “forward defense” doctrine exposed, the IRGC, reeling from the elimination of senior IRGC figures following losses in Lebanon and Syria, wanted to insulate the Houthis. This is because the Houthis remain a resilient lever of leverage on maritime trade via the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Second, the Houthis also sought to pragmatically lower their tempo and prioritize survival—having experienced significant losses and damage during the 51-day U.S. strikes between mid-March and May 7. Third, the available stockpile of drones and missiles—in case escalating scenarios play out—could be used in a more challenging moment. Therefore, the Houthis’ strategic insulation reveals a shift in the Axis’ operating model, from concerted proxy retaliation to calibrated survival, and the Houthis’ wariness of renewing the possibility of an internationally backed ground offensive.

The Houthi–Israeli confrontation is a clear front. Although calibrated, more decisive action by Israel is highly likely—it is no longer a matter of if, but when and how. The latest Houthi renewal of maritime attacks, sinking two ships (Magic Seasand Eternity C) in July 2025, killing at least four seafarers, and kidnapping at least six others, undermines the credibility of the U.S.-Houthi ceasefire reached in May 2025. Most recently, Houthi leader Abdul-Malek al-Houthi reaffirmed continuation of attacks into Israel and on Israeli ships in the Red Sea while dismissing the cost of destruction their actions impose on civilians and the strained Yemeni economy. Houthi attacks into Israel may continue even after the announcement of another ceasefire in Gaza, as seen in Q1 2025.

With Iran significantly weakened and Israel largely gaining the upper hand in the north, the Houthis may rise on Israel’s target list in the coming months. In December 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made clear that “The Houthis will also learn what Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and others have learned—and even if it takes time, this lesson will be learned across the entire Middle East.” It is increasingly likely that Israel will continue to lobby for the renewal of further U.S. action against the Houthis in Yemen.

Ibrahim Jalal is a Non-Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute’s Arabian Peninsula Program and a senior consultant. He has worked with donors and international organizations including the United Nations, the Overseas Development Institute, and Sussex University's Institute of Development Studies in research and advisory capacities. He also takes part in Track II events related to Yemen and the wider Middle East region..