The Khor Mor Terrorist Attack: Experts React

The Khor Mor attack is a litmus test for the Trump administration

Dr. Ranj Alaaldin, Middle East Peace & Security Forum

The attack on the Khor Mor gas field in Kurdistan underscores the reality that Iran-aligned militias, operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), continue to act with impunity, undermining Kurdistan's stability, U.S. interests and Iraq's sovereignty. These militias have evolved far beyond their original role in defeating ISIS. They now function as a parallel army, armed and funded through the state, yet loyal to Tehran and capable of subjugating state institutions and political rivals. The PMF has used its autonomy and support from Iran to repeatedly attack civilian infrastructure.

The attack on Khor Mor is by no means an isolated one: in recent years, Iran and its proxies have repeatedly struck energy infrastructure, in addition to residential areas that killed a prominent businessman and his 11 month-old daughter. Over several years, Iran-aligned groups have attacked U.S.-led coalition bases across Iraq and Syria as part of a concerted effort to expel U.S. forces from both countries,

The attack represents a coercive measure aimed both at the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and at Washington, asserting that the militias intend to use violent tactics to shape the post-election political climate and government formation process. With Baghdad unwilling to restrain the militias, the PMF’s campaign of aggression against Kurdistan will undermine U.S. strategic interests while reinforcing Iran's position following the past year of devastating losses for the Islamic Republic.

The United States faces a clear choice. Mere statements of support for Kurdistan or condemnations of militia attacks are insufficient. Washington must translate political posturing into tangible deterrence. This includes pressuring Prime Minister Sudani to reign in the militias. The buck stops with Prime Minister Sudani –– the militias responsible for the attack are enabled and paid by the Iraqi state. The PMF should understand that continued attacks on energy infrastructure, foreign investment, or civilian populations, in addition to any attempt to use coercive measures to negotiate with Kurdistan as the government formation process accelerates, will carry immediate costs.

If Baghdad fails to prevent future attacks, Washington should treat the Iraqi state as a complicit actor, rather than a neutral third party. In tandem with this approach, which could see the threat of sanctions on the Iraqi state used as leverage, the Trump administration (which has threatened such sanctions in the past) can also bolster air-defence and counter-drone capabilities in Kurdistan, while using targeted sanctions and the use of force to establish and enforce red lines for the militias. Only by establishing and enforcing clear red lines can Washington protect its interests and those of its allies, while safeguarding its strategic interests in the wider region.

The Khor Mor attack and the urgent need to neutralise Iran’s proxy miliitas in Iraq

Alex Plitsas, Atlantic Council

The November 26th 2025 drone strike on the Khor Mor gas field in Iraqi Kurdistan was not a random act of sabotage. It was a calculated blow against Iraqi Kurdistan, the country’s economic lifeline and its already fragile sovereignty. The complex, operated by UAE-based Dana Gas and Pearl Petroleum, produces more than 500m cubic feet of gas a day and supplies more than 80% of the Kurdistan region’s electricity. The attack ignited a storage tank, forced a complete production shutdown and plunged much of northern Iraq into darkness. The economic damage runs into the tens of millions; the political damage is harder to quantify.

Responsibility points squarely to Iran-aligned factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Khor Mor has been struck repeatedly—four times in 2024 alone, including attacks that killed four Yemeni workers—yet the perpetrators still operate with impunity. These groups are no longer the volunteer fighters who helped defeat ISIS in 2017. They have morphed into a parallel army: militant leaders turned mafia bosses, funded by the Iraqi state yet answering to Tehran, capable of vetoing government policy, assassinating activists and, now, torching critical infrastructure to punish foreign investment and Kurdish autonomy during government formation.

For Iraq, the consequences are existential. Each successful attack deters the foreign capital that Baghdad desperately needs, deepens the Baghdad–Erbil rift and strengthens Iran’s ability to shape Iraqi foreign and security policy from afar. A state cannot plausibly claim sovereignty when armed factions on its payroll can trigger energy crises and regional escalation at will.

The federal government has only two credible options. First, to integrate those PMF units willing to submit fully to state authority into the regular armed forces—under a unified command structure, with standardised pay and no tolerance for dual loyalties. Second, to disband the recalcitrant, Tehran-controlled factions: strip them of heavy weapons, prosecute their leadership for terrorism and end their state funding. Half-measures, “reform committees” and symbolic integration have failed for eight years and will continue to do so.

The attack on Khor Mor is yet more evidence that the PMF’s current configuration is incompatible with a functional Iraqi state. Baghdad must decide whether it wishes to remain a playground for foreign proxies or finally become a sovereign nation.

Protecting Kurdistan’s energy security in an era of escalating threats

Jessica Obeid, New Energy Consult

The attack on the Khor Mor gas facility in Kurdistan underscores how energy infrastructure has become a proxy battleground for regional influence, and highlights the need for action on both energy and security fronts. The strike halted operations at the field, triggered widespread power outages and exposed the structural vulnerabilities of the region’s energy systems. Khor Mor is one of Kurdistan’s largest gas sites, with 9.2trn cubic feet of proven reserves, and powers roughly 80% of the region’s electricity. Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum—the majority stakeholders in the Pearl Consortium that operates the field—recently announced a $1.1bn expansion to lift processing capacity to 750m standard cubic feet per day, funded by international partners.

The field’s strategic importance lies in its potential to boost Iraq’s energy exports, open a route into European markets and reduce the country’s reliance on Iranian imports. Armed groups, however, view Kurdistan’s broader gas expansion as a threat to Iran’s energy leverage—and with it, its political clout—in Iraq.

At the energy-system level, the attack reinforces a basic tenet of energy security: diversified supplies are essential to reduce systemic exposure to disruption. Kurdistan therefore needs to accelerate investment in alternative sources, storage and efficiency. That includes rolling out renewables with storage, reducing gas flaring, expanding reserve capacity and developing demand-side management alongside emergency-response planning and grid resilience. All this demands capital mobilisation. Yet repeated attacks only heighten perceived risk and deepen investor wariness. To counter this, meaningful de-risking measures are needed, including credible security commitments from both the Kurdistan region and the federal government.

Bolstering the resilience of critical energy infrastructure also requires coherent security strategies, with transparent investigations into attacks to reinforce state legitimacy, deter future strikes and lower long-term risks.

International partners have a role, too. Energy security underpins national stability and economic resilience, and failures can quickly spill into wider regional instability. Prolonged blackouts cascade across essential services—from water supply and productive sectors to hospitals and humanitarian operations.

Such attacks threaten the foundations of Kurdistan’s development model and Iraq’s fragile stability at a moment of heightened regional tension.

An audacious attack enabled by Iran

Dr. Yaniv Voller, Royal United Services Institute

The Khor Mor missile strike in November was only the latest assault on the Kurdistan Region by Iraq-based, pro-Iran paramilitary groups. The rule of thumb is that attacks on Kurdistan attract international attention only when they disrupt regional energy production or affect foreign energy firms. In reality, strikes on Kurdish territory are routine.

Since 2014 the KRG has stood at the forefront of the region’s war on terrorism—first against Islamic State, and since 2017 primarily against pro-Iran armed groups in Iraq that act in service of Tehran’s interests. An attack of such audacity, targeting Kurdish territory, civilian infrastructure and international investment, is unlikely to have occurred without Iran’s blessing or, at minimum, tacit consent, along with arms and logistical support.

The KRG has long highlighted its role in countering terrorism and containing Iranian influence in both the Kurdistan Region and Iraq. It has repeatedly pressed Washington and other Western partners for access to sophisticated anti-drone and anti-missile systems, as well as limited offensive capabilities that would allow Kurdish security forces to pre-empt future strikes.

The Khor Mor attack signals not only Tehran’s heightened belligerence after the blows it suffered in its confrontation with Israel and the United States earlier this year, but also the fragility of peace and stability across the region. Iran and Islamic State remain prime examples of local disruptors intent on sowing chaos and undermining the interests of the United States and its allies.

This attack should therefore serve as a sharp wake-up call: the KRG is a critical partner in countering terrorism from both state-backed and extremist actors—and should be supported accordingly.

The attack was a brazen message to Washington

Dr. Yerevan Saeed, American University in Washington

The missile strike on the Khor Mor gas facility appears designed to target more than infrastructure. It was a brazen message to Washington as much as to the Kurdistan Region. The attack disrupted a fuel source central to electricity generation, hit the region’s economic backbone and everyday stability, and effectively shattered America’s deterrence after bold statements against militia groups—coming, no less, amid the visit of a senior US official to inaugurate one of the largest American diplomatic facilities in the world, in Erbil.

The timing sharpened the coercive intent. The strike landed during a moment of heightened political sensitivity, when perceptions of power, impunity and leverage are being recalibrated after Iraq’s elections—just two weeks earlier—saw Shi’a militia-linked parties, including US-designated terrorist groups, make substantial gains, with some doubling their seats. The attack thus reads less like an isolated security incident and more like a signal from actors emboldened by political momentum. It also comes shortly before the K250 expansion—financed by the US government—is set to add 250m standard cubic feet per day of processing capacity, pushing Khor Mor’s total output toward 750m. Sabotaging the site now is a direct bid to undermine an imminent step change in the region’s energy security and economic leverage.

It is also a test, and a direct challenge, to Washington. The strike coincided with Deputy Secretary of State Michael Rigas’s visit to Erbil to inaugurate the new US consulate, an emblem of sustained American commitment to Kurdistan. It further contests the credibility of the Trump administration’s unusually blunt recent posture, reinforced by Special Envoy Mark Savaya’s warnings against militia violence and promises of accountability.

Baghdad’s role is pivotal—and increasingly difficult to separate from events on the ground. The federal government’s complicity has been evident in its failure to prevent repeated attacks, sluggish investigations and persistent unwillingness to hold perpetrators—many of whom are on the state payroll—accountable. In such a context, impunity functions as a form of authorisation.

The pattern also suggests selective coercion aimed at Kurdistan rather than Iraq’s energy sector writ large. The repeated strikes on the region’s infrastructure complement Baghdad’s political, economic, legal and administrative efforts to stall or reverse the Kurdistan Region’s development. If the objective were simply to prevent Iraq becoming energy self-sufficient to the detriment of a neighbouring state, similar attacks would target federal Iraq’s own gas-to-power expansion projects. The asymmetry suggests the real target is not Iraq’s energy future but Kurdistan’s ability to convert energy into autonomy and bargaining power.

US policy now requires a significant shift—from statements to actual deterrence and conditionality. Washington can support Kurdistan by accelerating counter-drone and site-defence assistance for critical infrastructure, expanding intelligence-sharing focused on threat networks and applying targeted sanctions on operational and financial facilitators of attacks. It should also impose conditions on aspects of engagement with Baghdad to ensure transparent investigations and credible prosecutions. At the same time, Washington should double down on energy and commercial commitments with the Kurdistan Region; any retreat would validate the strike’s central aim, demonstrating that violence can veto development.

Iran is searching for new ways to pressure U.S. forces in the region

Dr. Alia Brahimi, Atlantic Council

The rocket attack on the Khor Mor gas field reflects a broader shape-shifting underway within Iraq’s threat landscape following several regional shocks. First, the events of October 7th and their aftermath weakened key Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria, elevating the importance of Iran-aligned militias in Iraq. Second, the bombing of Iranian nuclear and military sites by Israeli and American aircraft in June has left Tehran searching for new ways to pressure US forces in the region and re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.

Third, the continuing drawdown of US troops in Iraq means remaining personnel will be concentrated in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. As the chips fall, Kurdistan is increasingly likely to be treated by Iranian-linked militias as a stand-in for American interests. Its own tensions with Baghdad—over budgets, hydrocarbon revenues and power-sharing—now dovetail with the broader geopolitical confrontation between Iran and the United States.

The potential for escalation is plain. Kurdish leaders will push hard for access to what they describe as game-changing weaponry needed “to defend our skies and critical infrastructure.” Yet Baghdad remains adamant that such air-defence systems belong exclusively in federal hands, not with regional authorities.

At the same time, the federal government will face mounting pressure to disarm the Iran-aligned militias—widely believed to be behind the Khor Mor strike—that are deeply embedded in the Iraqi state apparatus, parliament and economy. As with demands to disarm non-state actors elsewhere in the region—from Hamas in Gaza to Hizbullah in Lebanon—the task carries the risk of nothing less than renewed civil conflict.

The attack on Khor Mor undercuts the assurances of Iraq’s political leaders

Sarhang Hamasaeed, Peacebuilding Practitioner

The attack on Khor Mor undercuts the assurances of Iraq’s political leaders that the country is experiencing political stability. In reality, Iraq is in a phase of fragile calm that such strikes periodically puncture. For nearly a decade, Iraqi civilian and military officials have privately maintained that state security institutions are strong enough to prevent these attacks—often carried out by the same actors who have targeted US interests—yet there remains an insufficient will to use that capability. The strike also reflects an enduring mindset among some groups that political objectives are best pursued through force and intimidation rather than dialogue, persuasion or other civilian means.

The attack on Khor Mor—and on other energy installations earlier this year—undermines not only the Kurdistan Regional Government’s efforts to attract foreign investors but also those of the federal government and its political allies. Iraq’s investment climate may be improving unevenly across sectors, but the spectacle of businesses facing armed drones, rockets and missiles damages the investment prospects of the entire country. Politically, actors who believe they stand to benefit from pressuring the Kurdistan Region or slowing its economic progress are hardly convincing Iraqis that they can govern more effectively.

Stability and economic growth in the Kurdistan Region have helped lay the foundations for more organic ties with the rest of Iraq. The Region hosted more than a million displaced Iraqis during the fight against ISIS; growing numbers of Iraqis now travel to Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah for tourism and business, while professionals and firms from the Region operate increasingly in Baghdad and the south. These are trends worth supporting—not disrupting—through violence from within.

Iraq could, and should, seek the support of the United States and other partners to strengthen its defensive capabilities—especially for detecting and countering threats to its airspace. Until recently, airspace protection was not high on Washington’s priority list, according to Congressman Darin LaHood. But after the Khor Mor strike, US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Sayava reaffirmed America’s commitment to enhancing the federal government’s defensive capacity, pledging: “Together, we will continue to protect Iraq’s resources, defend its sovereignty, and ensure the security and well-being of all its citizens.” Even so, experience shows that no system of radars or weapons is foolproof—as the attacks on Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia in 2019, on Doha earlier this year, or during the 12-Day Israel–Iran conflict have demonstrated.

The more durable solution lies in a shift in mindset: recognising that violence is no path to resolving political differences. Iraq’s long and bloody history, before and after 2003, offers ample evidence of this. A more inclusive and accelerated effort to implement the “Development Road” project would serve Iraq far better than attacking Khor Mor or squeezing the Kurdistan Region. A bigger, growing economic pie benefits all; a shrinking one benefits no one.

Yet another reminder that Iran-aligned groups operate beyond the reach of the government

Victoria Taylor, Atlantic Council

The latest round of militia strikes on Khor Mor is yet another reminder that Iraq’s Iran-aligned armed groups continue to operate beyond the reach of government control and in ways that run counter to Iraq’s own interests. The attack adds to a troubling pattern of strikes on energy infrastructure in Kurdistan, including a series over the summer of 2025. Khor Mor itself has been repeatedly targeted, notably in April 2024, when a strike killed four Yemeni workers. Although four individuals were arrested for that attack, the courts later released them for lack of evidence. The inability of Iraq’s security services and judiciary to hold militias accountable—at Khor Mor or elsewhere—has allowed these groups to act with relative impunity and has almost certainly contributed to the continuation of such strikes.

The motivation behind the attacks remains unclear, as the militias have avoided claiming responsibility. The timing of the July strike on HKN’s Sarsang field—on the very day the firm signed an agreement in Baghdad for the Hamrin oil field—invites speculation that the aim is to undermine US and foreign investment in Kurdistan’s energy sector. Yet there is no evidence of direct Iranian orchestration; the motive may be more parochial and pecuniary than strategic.

Regardless of motive, responsibility rests with Baghdad to hold the perpetrators accountable and take more decisive steps to bring all armed forces under state control. The Framework has rightly condemned the attack, and notably, so have several Iran-aligned militias, including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba. But repeated drone and rocket strikes imperil Baghdad’s efforts to court US investment, undermine Iraq’s energy security and cast doubt on claims of political stability. The cost of inaction is borne not only by Kurdistan, but by Iraq as a whole.

The central question now is how Prime Minister Sudani intends to respond

Dr. Mohammed Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute

The latest attack on the Khor Mor gas field in the Chamchamal area—now reportedly the eleventh since 2022—comes as the facility’s output has climbed to roughly 500 million cubic feet per day. The strike was almost certainly carried out by Iran-backed militias in Iraq and should be understood within two overlapping contexts: Iraq’s post-election government formation and the broader contest over the country’s energy independence.

As coalition negotiations open in Baghdad, pro-Iran factions are intent on consolidating their grip on the state. In that light, the attack serves as a coercive signal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to quickly align behind the Shia Coordination Framework’s eventual nominee for prime minister.

The strike also challenges the Kurdistan Region’s efforts to advance Iraq’s natural-gas autonomy. Iran exports between $4–5 billion worth of gas annually to power Iraq’s electricity grid—an economic lifeline for Tehran under sanctions and one of its most effective levers over Baghdad. Hitting Khor Mor therefore directly undercuts U.S. policy, which seeks to push Iraq toward energy self-sufficiency, limit Iranian influence under the maximum-pressure framework, and support efforts to constrain the militias. It also signals to foreign energy firms that any project threatening Iran’s commercial or strategic interests in Iraq carries real risk.

The central question now is how Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani intends to respond. It is an open secret among Iraqis and outside observers that many of the groups launching these attacks are funded and armed by the state via the Popular Mobilization Forces structure. Yet the government has taken no meaningful steps to restrain them.

Whatever benefit of the doubt Sudani once enjoyed on confronting the militias has long evaporated. Baghdad can no longer sidestep responsibility: it must either name these groups openly and sever their state support, or accept that its credibility as a sovereign authority over foreign-directed armed actors will continue to erode. Washington, too, should judge the Coordination Framework–led government by whether it is willing—and able—to rein in these militias.

Kurdistan's alliance with the United States places it in the worst strategic position

Francesco Salesio Schiavi, Middle East Institute

The latest attack on the Khor Mor gas field marks a troubling escalation in both capability and intent. No group has claimed responsibility, but analysts and local officials identify Iran-linked militias as the most plausible perpetrators. Over the past two years, drone technology has become widely accessible to non-state actors in Iraq, complicating attribution and narrowing response options. Even so, the sophistication of this strike stands out. Rather than engaging in routine perimeter harassment, the drone hit a key processing unit—an indication of precision consistent with the more capable militia networks operating within the IRGC’s orbit.

The timing is equally revealing. Iraq has entered a sensitive government-formation phase following elections that strengthened Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the main Sunni bloc. Any governing arrangement that dilutes the influence of PMF-aligned parties threatens entrenched political and economic interests across the militia landscape. Striking Khor Mor—which supplies roughly 80 percent of the Kurdistan Region’s electricity—serves as a costly reminder that these groups retain de facto veto power over Iraq’s political trajectory.

The attack also comes just ahead of the opening of a new U.S. consulate in Erbil, a development Tehran is unlikely to ignore as it recalibrates its deterrence posture following months of confrontation with Israel and the United States.

This vulnerability is exacerbated by the Kurdistan Region’s lack of adequate air-defense and counter-drone systems. Kurdish authorities have repeatedly sought U.S. and U.K. assistance to secure critical infrastructure, but Baghdad has blocked procurement requests on the grounds that such systems must remain under federal control. Western partners, in turn, insist they cannot proceed without federal authorization—leaving Erbil exposed as the attacks grow more sophisticated.

The Kurdish people cannot continue to serve as a convenient pressure valve for regional signaling. Being close to the United States but not protected by it places them in the worst strategic position imaginable. If Washington is serious about preventing further escalation, it must translate political assurances into practical deterrence—whether by conditioning assistance to Baghdad or enhancing protection for critical sites in the Kurdistan Region.