The Airstrike on Doha Erodes Gulf Security Guarantees

Francesco Salesio Schiavi, Middle East Institute of Switzerland

The emergency summit convened in Doha after Israel’s strike on Qatari soil offered a rare moment of Arab and Islamic unity. The discussions were long and serious, reflecting the sense among leaders that something fundamental had shifted. What was at stake was not only Qatar’s sovereignty but the credibility of the security architecture on which the Gulf has relied on for decades.

For much of the modern era, Gulf states have invested heavily in the assumption that hosting U.S. forces, buying American weapons, and aligning with Washington would provide a reliable shield. That assumption, first undermined by the 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities, was further eroded this year, when Qatar was twice targeted by missile fire — most recently by none other than Washington’s closest regional ally. The symbolism of an Israeli strike in a Gulf capital — one hosting ceasefire talks under U.S. auspices — cannot be overstated. It demonstrated that deterrence is no longer guaranteed, even under the eyes of the United States.

The Doha summit’s statements reflected this realization. Qatar’s emir argued that the attack was not only a violation of sovereignty but an assault on mediation itself — the very function Qatar has cultivated as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Doha has long played this role not in isolation but at Washington’s request; Hamas’ political bureau was allowed to operate in Doha partly because the United States needed a channel to actors it would not engage directly. Israel’s strike thus undermined not just Qatari diplomacy but also the broader architecture of mediation on which Washington had quietly relied.

Qatar now faces a dilemma almost unthinkable until recently. In the span of a single year, it has been struck twice — first by Iran, targeting the U.S. base at Al-Udeid during a brief conflict triggered by Israel that dragged Washington into the fray; and then by Israel in an operation the U.S. either could not prevent or did not wish to block. Whether with American consent or presented as a fait accompli, the outcome is the same: the attack revealed who ultimately drives the military dynamic in the Middle East.

This leaves Doha in a deeply uncomfortable position. Its strategy of survival has rested on being indispensable to everyone — the “Switzerland of the Middle East.” Yet today, officials are openly weighing whether to ask Hamas’ political leadership to relocate. Doing so would damage Qatar’s leverage as mediator, but keeping Hamas in place risks more attacks. Until recently, such a choice would have been unimaginable. Now it encapsulates the cost of playing mediator when neither Israel nor the United States can guarantee that role’s protection.

At the same time, the summit exposed the limits of collective action. Calls for states to review ties with Israel were nonbinding, and divisions remain significant, particularly for those that normalized relations under the Abraham Accords. The rhetoric of solidarity is real, but the scope for punitive measures is constrained by national interests, economic considerations, and the fear of escalation. Still, public opinion in Bahrain and the UAE has been jolted by the strike on their neutral neighbor, and pressure on governments to re-evaluate normalization will only grow. Yet Abu Dhabi in particular knows that the most powerful card — walking away from the Accords — can only be played once, and will likely reserve it for the moment Israel moves from de facto to de jure annexation of the West Bank.

Still, the debate is shifting. Officials openly discussed alternatives at the summit: strengthening the GCC’s joint military command, exploring an Arab-NATO concept long on hold, and enhancing regional air and missile defense. Beyond these familiar proposals, new ad hoc security arrangements are emerging: Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have intensified coordination with Doha; there are discussions of a “6+2” framework involving Turkey and Egypt; and Saudi Arabia has just signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan. These efforts may lack coherence, but they reflect a perception that reliance on the United States alone is insufficient. As one Gulf official expressed privately during the summit, if the United States cannot restrain Israel or deter Iran, then regional states will eventually have to take more responsibility for their own defense.

The strike also reveals a central paradox of U.S. policy. Washington continues to rely on Qatar as an indispensable mediator — from Afghanistan to hostage negotiations in Gaza — and yet it proved unable or unwilling to shield Doha when it became a target. Gulf rulers miscalculated their leverage in Washington, assuming Donald Trump’s closeness to Gulf monarchies would allow him to restrain Tel Aviv. Instead, they discovered that Netanyahu pursues a unilateral vision largely free from American constraints. The result is frustration on both sides: Qatar sees its diplomatic role, sovereignty, and security as endangered, while the United States risks losing credibility as a security provider at the very moment when it asks Gulf partners to do more.

American political signals have done little to reassure regional states. Secretary of State Marco Rubio timed his visit to Tel Aviv and joint press conference with Netanyahu to coincide with the Arab-Islamic summit, signaling strong support for Israel. Rubio’s subsequent visit to Doha stressed the administration’s desire for Qatar to continue its mediation despite the risk.

For Israel, the short-term gain of striking Hamas in neutral Qatar may be offset by long-term costs. By attacking in Doha — and doing so just one day after Hamas negotiators had reportedly reached an agreement with the United States on a ceasefire proposal — Tel Aviv effectively blew up the negotiating table: an act that is hard to interpret other than as an intentional attempt to prevent talks from continuing. In striking where mediation was actively taking place, Israel has shaken public opinion in states such as Bahrain and the UAE, which normalized ties under the Abraham Accords, raising doubts about the durability of those agreements and complicating Israeli regional diplomacy. If Gulf capitals conclude that closer relations with Israel do not restrain its actions, but instead increase their vulnerability, the strategic logic of diplomatic engagement weakens.

The Doha summit thus marks a turning point. It did not produce a new alliance or a unified military plan, but it clarified a perception that the regional order is changing. The U.S. security umbrella remains, but with visible gaps; Israel acts with an autonomy that destabilizes its own partnerships; and Iran remains an ever-present risk. For Gulf states, the question is no longer whether to diversify their security options, but how quickly and in what direction.

Whether the words in Doha translate into action is uncertain. History suggests that regional divisions will reassert themselves once the immediacy of the crisis fades. But the realization remains: the assumptions that underpinned Gulf security for decades are under strain. The Israeli strike not only changed Qatar’s calculations but also accelerated a wider strategic debate — one that will define the Gulf’s approach to defense and diplomacy in the years ahead.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an independent Middle East analyst and consultant specialized in the international relations and security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf. His expertise includes military and diplomatic interventions by international actors in the MENA region, as well as in military technologies of some of the leading Middle Eastern actors in this sector. He is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS).