Riyadh’s Iraq Question: Stability, Influence, and the 2025 Elections

Cinzia Bianco, European Council on Foreign Relations

Iraq’s elections will unfold amid the most dangerous regional climate in two decades. After a year of sustained escalation — Israeli strikes deep inside Syria and Lebanon, Iranian retaliation across multiple fronts, and direct Israel–Iran confrontation — the entire northern arc of the Middle East is being reshaped. Iraq sits at the center of that transformation. For Saudi Arabia, what happens in Baghdad will influence not only the Gulf’s security but also the viability of the emerging regional order.

The real story is what kind of state will emerge to face Iraq’s long-standing dilemma: maintaining sovereignty while surrounded by rival powers that use its territory as a pressure valve.

Saudi policymakers are realistic about Iraq’s internal dynamics. The Shia establishment will remain dominant, and Iranian influence will not disappear. But the aim is not confrontation: it is to expand Arab and Gulf leverage inside Iraq without triggering a new conflict with Tehran. That means strengthening Iraq’s institutions, investing in shared infrastructure rather than competing patronage and cultivating relationships across the spectrum, from Baghdad to Erbil, giving the Kingdom durable access and political weight. More than ever, the first item on the agenda is the next Iraqi government’s ability to restrain militia activity and rein in their ability to act unconstrained.

For Riyadh, Iraq’s stability has become a strategic necessity, not a matter of goodwill. The Kingdom’s calculus has evolved since 2021 from cautious re-engagement to strategic positioning. Iraq is now viewed as part of a northern Arab belt — alongside Syria and Jordan — that must be stabilized and reconnected to prevent further regional fragmentation. In particular, Riyadh wants to work on Syria-Iraq relations. Smuggling networks, militia supply routes, and Iranian logistic lines all cross that border and managing that would be a key step in the broader regional stability picture. But this strategy depends on keeping Iraq from becoming the next flashpoint between Iran and Israel.

The Kurdistan Region will be essential to Saudi Arabia’s balancing act in Iraq. Erbil remains the most functional interlocutor in Iraq, with open channels to the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and increasingly the Gulf. The Kurdish leadership can serve as a stabilizer and an intermediary, especially in the post-election period. For Saudi Arabia, deepening relations with the Kurdistan Region is both a stabilizing tool and a means of diversifying influence inside Iraq beyond traditional Sunni networks.

At the same time, Riyadh is cautious about navigating Iraqi politics and going beyond the old formula of pressure without legitimacy, which only produces instability. Saudi engagement will therefore continue to focus on economic leverage and connectivity — expanding the electricity grid link, opening logistics corridors to the Gulf, and supporting investment, especially in the energy sector. These initiatives do not challenge Iran directly but gradually shift Iraq’s economic gravity southward and westward, integrating it into a regional system less dependent on conflict dynamics.

If Israel and Iran clash again, Iraq will be one of the first arenas to absorb the impact. For Riyadh, the outcome of the upcoming elections will be measured not by who wins, but by whether the next Iraqi government can withstand the next regional storm.The upcoming Iraqi elections will unfold amid the most dangerous regional climate in two decades. After a year of sustained escalation — Israeli strikes deep inside Syria and Lebanon, Iranian retaliation across multiple fronts, and direct Israel–Iran confrontation — the entire northern arc of the Middle East is being reshaped. Iraq sits at the center of that transformation. For Saudi Arabia, what happens in Baghdad will influence not only the Gulf’s security but also the viability of the emerging regional order.

The real story is what kind of state will emerge to face Iraq’s long-standing dilemma: maintaining sovereignty while surrounded by rival powers that use its territory as a pressure valve. Saudi policymakers are realistic about Iraq’s internal dynamics. The Shia establishment will remain dominant, and Iranian influence will not disappear. But the aim is not confrontation: it is to expand Arab and Gulf leverage inside Iraq without triggering a new conflict with Tehran. That means strengthening Iraq’s institutions, investing in shared infrastructure rather than competing patronage and cultivating relationships across the spectrum, from Baghdad to Erbil, giving the Kingdom durable access and political weight. More than ever, the first item on the agenda is the next Iraqi government’s ability to restrain militia activity and rein in their ability to act unconstrained.

For Riyadh, Iraq’s stability has become a strategic necessity, not a matter of goodwill. The Kingdom’s calculus has evolved since 2021 from cautious re-engagement to strategic positioning. Iraq is now viewed as part of a northern Arab belt — alongside Syria and Jordan — that must be stabilized and reconnected to prevent further regional fragmentation. In particular, Riyadh wants to work on Syria-Iraq relations. Smuggling networks, militia supply routes, and Iranian logistic lines all cross that border and managing that would be a key step in the broader regional stability picture. But this strategy depends on keeping Iraq from becoming the next flashpoint between Iran and Israel.

The Kurdistan Region will be essential to Saudi Arabia’s balancing act in Iraq. Erbil remains the most functional interlocutor in northern Iraq, with open channels to the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and increasingly the Gulf. The Kurdish leadership can serve as a stabilizer and an intermediary, especially in the post-election period. For Saudi Arabia, deepening relations with the Kurdistan Region is both a stabilizing tool and a means of diversifying influence inside Iraq beyond traditional Sunni networks.

At the same time, Riyadh is cautious about navigating Iraqi politics and going beyond the old formula of pressure without legitimacy, which only produces instability. Saudi engagement will therefore continue to focus on economic leverage and connectivity — expanding the electricity grid link, opening logistics corridors to the Gulf, and supporting investment, especially in the energy sector. These initiatives do not challenge Iran directly but gradually shift Iraq’s economic gravity southward and westward, integrating it into a regional system less dependent on conflict dynamics.

If Israel and Iran clash again, Iraq will be one of the first arenas to absorb the impact. For Riyadh, the outcome of the upcoming elections will be measured not by who wins, but by whether the next Iraqi government can withstand the next regional storm..

Cinzia Bianco is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where she is working on political, security and economic developments in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region and relations with Europe. Additionally, she is a senior analyst at Gulf State Analytics. Previously, Bianco was a research fellow for the European Commission’s project on EU-GCC relations ‘Sharaka’ between 2013 and 2014.