Iraq’s Parliamentary Elections: Experts React

Dr. Mohammed Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute

On the surface, Iraq’s parliamentary elections appear similar to previous rounds—except for the notable absence of the Shia Sadrist Movement. Yet this vote carries particular significance: it could either cement the dominance of pro-Iran factions in Baghdad or mark the beginning of their decline. Much will depend on how firmly Washington enforces its reported condition that certain Iran-aligned groups be excluded from the next government.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told Al Arabiya on November 7 that the United States had informed Baghdad that six pro-Iran armed factions should not take part in the post-election government. He did not specify which groups, but according to Shia political figures and informed sources, they are believed to include Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali. These factions form the core of Iran’s influence network inside Iraq. If accurate, and if the U.S. position is enforced, this would represent a major American demand—and a significant test of its political will in Iraq.

These groups are distinctive not only for their close ties to Tehran but also because excluding them could partially reset Iraq’s political process. There is growing anticipation that Washington may finally be ready to apply sustained pressure, and this election could serve as a measure of that resolve. Several of the named factions are key components of the Popular Mobilization Forces and have held prominent positions within the outgoing government and parliament—most notably Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib

If Washington succeeds in preventing their participation in the next government, it would mark an important turning point—and, in many eyes, a corrective step—in Iraq’s post-2003 political trajectory. These factions formally entered politics in 2018 and further entrenched themselves after 2021, playing decisive roles in government formation. Their rise was remarkable given that only a few years earlier they had faced widespread anger in Iraq’s southern, Shia-majority provinces for their role in violently suppressing the October 2019 youth protests and for their perceived loyalty to Iran.

Whether the U.S. follows through remains uncertain. If Washington chooses not to press the issue, these groups’ hold over Baghdad and much of Iraq outside the Kurdistan Region will likely deepen, reinforced by the networks they have woven into state institutions over the past three years. The coming months will reveal whether Iran can sustain its entrenched influence through these political-military proxies—or whether the United States can capitalize on shifting regional dynamics and the broader weakening of the Iran-led axis to begin reshaping Iraq’s trajectory and balance of power.

Sir. John Jenkins, Former UK Ambassador to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya

Today marks the latest in a series of parliamentary elections in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. I was the British ambassador in Baghdad during perhaps the most fiercely contested of them all, in 2010, when Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition won 91 seats to Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law’s 89. After months of political maneuvering, Maliki ultimately secured a second term as prime minister — an outcome that ended badly. His tenure saw a catastrophic breakdown in Shia-Sunni and Arab-Kurdish relations, the rapid rise of Da’esh, the collapse of the Iraqi army in the north, and the loss of Mosul.

Those years revealed the deeper workings of Iraqi politics. First, the electoral system and the way parliamentary seats are allocated are decisive. Second, sectarian identity continues to wield immense mobilizing power, with the preservation of Shia dominance remaining central to determining who governs. Whenever that dominance is challenged — as in 2010 by Iraqiya or in 2019 by coordination between Sadrists, Sunnis, and Kurds — political turmoil follows. And third, Iraq’s real decisions are made not at the ballot box but in the elite bargaining that follows the vote.

Such dynamics are familiar across the region, but in Iraq, their persistence has bred frustration among ordinary citizens, particularly the young. This disillusionment has fueled waves of protest since the end of the Arab Spring — in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, and even non-Arab Iran.

The question now is whether Iraq — including the Kurdistan Regional Government, which faces its own political challenges — will join this wave of transformation or remain dependent on patronage networks that trade stability for stagnation. The outcome of these elections will offer important clues. There is a great deal at stake.

Dr. Ranj Alaaldin, Middle East Peace & Security Forum; World Bank

The election and its aftermath will also have long-term domestic implications. The relationship between the Iraqi state and society has taken a hit in recent years, with millions of Iraqis disenchanted and disenfranchised as a result of poor governance, corruption and authoritarian rule. While Kurdistan’s reform agenda has made major strides in recent years, including the implementation of major infrastructure projects and 24-hour electricity, Iraq remains mired in major socio-economic challenges as a result of a youth bulge, economic degradation, and dilapidated infrastructure.

The country’s population of more than 45 million is expected to reach 50 million in a decade. More than 60% of Iraqis are under 24, and 400,000 graduates seek to enter the job market each year. To compound these challenges, the Iraqi state and the post-2003 political order is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis because of the ruling elites’ failure to address the demands and grievances of the population, as expressed by the Tishreen protests, which sought a complete overhaul of the post-2003 political order.

In addition, the deep-rooted issues that paved the way for the failed uprising in 2019 remain, as do additional grievances emanating from the PMF’s state-backed violent crackdown, which saw 550 protesters shot dead, thousands injured and hundreds detained or kidnapped. Following the elections,, the trajectory of Iraq’s protest movement and the future of the post-2003 political order will hinge in no small part on the choices made by Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr commands not only Iraq’s most powerful socio-political movement but also a political bloc that has won the country’s last two parliamentary elections.

There are open questions over how Sadr intends to position himself in the coming post-election aftermath, with all eyes on the tensions that followed the last parliamentary elections and that resulted in armed conflict with the PMF. This time around, the PMF could be engaged in multiple contestations, including against its closest rival the Sadrists, a potentially revived protest movement, and finally Israel and the U.S., who may see post-election period as an opportunity to target the group.

These factors suggest the PMF lacks the space in which to engage its rivals using the violent tactics it deployed in the past to shape the post-election climate and government. The PMF, therefore, has an opportunity to recalibrate, moving toward peaceful engagement with its rivals to forestall its entry into a war with the United States that could result in untold losses both for itself and for Iraq.

Jennifer Gavito, Former Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Iraq rests at the crossroads of the Middle East, home to ancient civilizations and situated along major trade routes amid enduring geopolitical tensions. Its strategic position between the Gulf Arab states, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and—metaphorically, at least—the United States gives it an outsized role as a regional stabilizer or destabilizer in a Middle East that has been fundamentally transformed by the events of the past two years. This has been evident throughout the tumult of the past year, as Iraq has served as a central venue for unconventional escalation—power projection, drone strikes, proxy attacks, and the ongoing interplay between government and militias.

It is in this context that eyes from across the Middle East are focused on Iraq this week as its citizens head to the polls in national elections. Iran and its proxies have been weakened by an emboldened Israeli government that has targeted their operations and leadership both inside and outside the country. Tehran will fight to ensure its influence in Iraq is maintained. Turkey, meanwhile, seeks to emerge from the Gaza conflict as a true regional power, including by curbing the influence of both Iran and the PKK in northern Iraq, particularly along its border. These dynamics also extend across the frontier to Syria, which continues to struggle to chart a new course under the al-Sharaa-led interim government.

An Iraqi government capable of exercising strong, sovereign authority is essential to preventing an ISIS resurgence in both Iraq and Syria. The Kurdish parties, in particular, could serve as moderating actors in the evolving but crucial relationship between the SDF and Damascus. Amidst these shifting sands, the Gulf states have remained laser-focused on their own strategic visions for economic diversification and modernization.

Regional stability, however, is a precondition for these ambitions—opening the door to what may be Iraq’s greatest opportunity: a tilt toward deeper integration with its moderate neighbors as a source of stability and economic growth. It is a potential win-win, but one that requires the next Iraqi government to meaningfully strengthen state institutions, deliver basic services, and address corruption.

As experts gather this week in Duhok for the Middle East Peace and Security Forum to consider the path forward, one thing is clear: the Kurdish parties should play a pivotal role in shaping Iraq’s next chapter. Yet, a year after the Kurdistan Region held its own elections, the main parties remain deadlocked over cabinet formation—effectively undermining Kurdish influence in Baghdad. This must be addressed. The Kurdistan Region has long been a strong U.S. ally, even hosting American military installations, and it should leverage its diplomatic position between Ankara, Baghdad, Washington, and Syria (including its Kurdish population). Central to this effort is a normalized relationship with federal Iraq that ensures institutional integration in key areas such as budgeting, revenue sharing, governance, and security.