The Syrian Government’s Attack on Syria's Kurds: Experts React

Regional Security Requires Addressing the Kurdish question

Dr. Kamaran Palani, London School of Economics & Political Science

Kurds across the Middle East have viewed the conflict in Syria—between Damascus and its allied armed groups, backed by regional powers, and Kurdish forces—as an attack targeting Kurds collectively. This perception has brought Kurds throughout the region together in an unprecedented way, with the broader Kurdistan space increasingly treated as one. What has unfolded in Syria over the past month cannot be reduced to an internal Syrian matter; rather, the Kurdish question across the region must be brought to the forefront of any prospects for regional security and peace.

The regional and international dimensions of this conflict have been unmistakable. There has been a significant degree of convergence among many national and international powers regarding Syria, particularly in their support for Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s transitional government. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have provided various forms of support to Al-Sharaa and to the tribes and armed groups allied with Damascus against the SDF. The United States has not acted as a neutral player or mediator, but has supported Al-Sharaa, while Israel and other regional players have effectively done the same through their silence. This has created an environment in which it has become exceedingly difficult for Kurds to resist and preserve what they have achieved.

Yet there is no guarantee that this situation will remain permanent. A ceasefire is now in place, and a new agreement between Damascus and the SDF was signed on 30 January 2026. The agreement is being implemented and appears to be holding, despite deep mistrust, fragile security protocols, and the presence of local and regional spoilers on all sides. Moreover, Syria remains divided: tribal actors and armed groups do not consistently obey the government, despite how mainstream media sometimes portrays the situation. Syria’s fragility may create opportunities for Kurds to assert a stronger role—one that should enhance their ability to secure rights and a recognized status as a distinct collective group within Syria.

This makes the key task for Kurds in Syria all the more urgent—and it is here that the Kurdistan Region and other international stakeholders have a role to play: preparing for and supporting Syrian Kurds’ political integration and engagement in Syria’s future. Syria presents a difficult landscape. It is not post-2003 Iraq. It remains unclear whether there will be a genuine multi-party system competing in elections, or what type of constitution, electoral system, and government formation the country will adopt.

These uncertainties will require Syrian Kurds to mobilize significantly for what lies ahead for them and their country. While it is true that the SDF has been substantially weakened, it still retains sufficient military capability to be taken seriously, at least in its areas of Syria. The central task for Syrian Kurds now is to translate this military power into political leverage—to secure rights, representation, and influence in Syria’s evolving order.

Erbil as Mediator: Kurdish Diplomacy and the Battle to Save Rojava

Dr. Mohammed A. Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute

The military campaign by the Syrian army and its allied tribal militias against Syrian Kurds has triggered an unprecedented mobilization of Kurdish communities across the region and beyond. This response underscores the deeply transnational nature of the Kurdish question and has helped propel the Kurdistan Region into a renewed role as a center of gravity in Kurdish politics. The assaults by Syrian forces, and the atrocities accompanying them, have reignited a sense of pan-Kurdish solidarity unprecedented in both scale and intensity.

The solidarity and mobilization in Iraqi Kurdistan have been driven by a number of key factors.

First is the looming possibility of massacres against Kurds in Rojava. This is not a hypothetical concern. Given the past conduct of factions within the Syrian military during earlier Syrian opposition campaigns against Kurds—and more recently government operations against Druze and Alawite communities over the past year—Kurds at elite and popular levels are mobilizing to prevent a similar fate befalling their brethren in Rojava.

Second, there is the real possibility of a large influx of refugees from Rojava into the Kurdistan Region. Since the Syrian uprising in 2011, around 250,000 Syrians—mostly Kurds—have fled to Iraqi Kurdistan. Another major influx would place severe strain on the Kurdistan Region’s already struggling economy.

Third, a potential takeover of Rojava by the Syrian government is widely seen as a serious setback to the Kurdish struggle for justice and rights in the region. Such an outcome could also embolden the Iraqi government, and its backers in Tehran, to pursue a comparable course against the Kurdistan Region in the future.

Fourth, the reported escape and release of what appear to be hundreds of ISIS prisoners and their family members from detention camps points to the emergence of a long-term security crisis with potentially dire consequences for Kurds in Iraq. The possible collapse of Rojava and the deployment of Syrian army units—many of whose members are, ideologically and in their conduct of war, indistinguishable from ISIS—have further heightened these anxieties among Kurds and other Iraqis.

Fifth, full Syrian government control could open the door to future coordinated efforts by Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad to bypass the Silopi–Ibrahim Khalil border crossing as the primary trade gateway between Iraq and Turkey, placing major financial and economic strain on the Kurdistan Region.

Against this backdrop, Erbil—and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani—has emerged as a central hub for facilitating negotiations and dialogue among Damascus, Washington, and, indirectly, Turkey. Erbil’s aim is to halt the current hostilities, avert the collapse of Rojava, stabilize northeast Syria, and secure a political arrangement that grants Kurds a recognized status within the Syrian state. Should these efforts bear fruit, they would further consolidate Erbil’s role as a key center for Kurdish-related diplomacy in the years ahead. Iraqi Kurdistan, however, must tread a fine line if it is to contribute positively to a solution without inheriting lasting problems that may emerge from the current crisis.

The Stabilizing Efforts of President Masoud Barzani Has Been Instrumental

Dr. Yerevan Saeed, American University

The extensive humanitarian and financial support provided by Kurds across the world for Syrian Kurdistan has decisively challenged the persistent stereotype that Kurds are inherently divided and incapable of collective action. The magnitude and sustained nature of aid efforts, public mobilization, and global demonstrations have been particularly noteworthy because they show that Kurdish nationalism categorically rejects borders imposed on Kurdistan. More importantly, these actions convey a clear international message that Kurds increasingly reject a future determined solely by external actors.

A primary factor sustaining this momentum is the Kurdistan Region’s international diplomatic engagement. In response to attacks on Syrian Kurdistan by Islamic extremist groups associated with the government in Damascus, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has actively sought political support abroad and worked to keep the crisis a priority for key international stakeholders.

This diplomatic effort has aimed to raise awareness about the abuses Kurds face in Syria and translate international concern into action. Through outreach and lobbying, the KRG helped introduce the Save Kurds Act in the U.S. Senate. Even if the law does not pass, its introduction is an important sign of political recognition and suggests that further attacks could carry consequences. This may discourage the Damascus government and its allies from escalating their actions against Syrian Kurdistan.

At the same time, former Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani’s personal diplomatic efforts have helped stabilize the situation. By meeting with regional and international leaders, he opened new lines of communication, encouraged restraint, and lowered the risk of a wider conflict. His work also helped create conditions for a recent agreement between Damascus and Kurdish authorities in Syrian Kurdistan, which limited casualties and kept violence under control at a crucial moment.

The Attack on Syria’s Kurds Is a Blow to Counter-Terrorism Efforts

Dr. Yaniv Voller, Royal United Services Institute

Following the (Turkish-backed) Syrian army’s successful onslaught on the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) strongholds in al-Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, and its push toward Kobane, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government was able to impose on the leadership of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) a ceasefire that undermines its hard-won autonomy. These moves have been hailed as a victory for al-Sharaa on the path to removing obstacles to rebuilding Syria. However, this is an illusion. If anything, these recent events are a blow to regional counterterrorism efforts and to long-term peace in Syria.

With regard to counterterrorism efforts, the attack—and even more so Washington’s endorsement of the ceasefire—is yet another episode in which Rojava’s allies abandon one of their most reliable partners in the region, which, along with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Peshmerga forces, has proved among the most effective forces in defeating the Islamic State.

Based on past experience, it is likely that the SDF had anticipated such abandonment. Nevertheless, this move removes from regions vulnerable to insurgency the most capable force. The fall of al-Aqtan Prison in al-Raqqa, or al-Hawl camp, into the hands of Syrian government forces risks the release of thousands of Islamic State prisoners, whom trained Kurdish forces have kept at bay. The potential influx of insurgents is likely to destabilize Syria and increase the risk of an insurgent resurgence.

Moreover, if the Syrian civil war has taught us anything, it is that the oppression of Kurdish aspirations for autonomy is likely to encounter resistance. What post-war Syria requires is a delegation of governance across different regions to build national consensus. Further aggression on the path to imposed centralization, motivated by the interests of external powers, will not achieve the goal of reducing the risk of renewed violence.