Iran-Israel Conflict: The Aftermath

Blocking the Strait of Hormuz risks turning countries against Iran

Dr. Howard J. Shatz, RAND Corporation

The recent cease fire between Israel and Iran – and the United States – vastly lowered the risk of a global economic disruption. But even if the cease fire fails and war restarts, chances are strong that economic risks can be contained.

Oil prices jumped with Israel's action, suggesting that oil markets saw increased risk. Should fighting restart, two specific factors will determine how this risk manifests: first, whether Iran attacks Gulf Arab oil infrastructure, and second, whether passage through the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, as the Iranian parliament voted to do.

About 20 percent of world oil consumption, or 20 million barrels per day, passes through the strait, and it would be nearly impossible to make up that supply. Saudi Arabia can redirect an estimated 2.6 million barrels per day through a pipeline to the Red Sea, and oil producers that do not need to export through the strait have about 0.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity.

At the same time, the strait has never been fully blockaded, and it is wide. The United States and Israel have total air superiority over Iran, and the United States has naval superiority, suggesting they can keep oil flowing. Additionally, blockading the strait would hurt Iran’s partners and friendly neutrals, especially China and other Asian purchasers, as well as Gulf Arab exporters, who have criticized the attack and stayed on the sidelines. Therefore, an attempt to blockade the strait appears counterproductive—it would likely be ineffective and would risk turning countries against Iran.

As to whether the current ceasefire will hold, both the United States and Israel have stated they are not aiming at regime change, and it might even be in their interests if the current Iranian regime continues. Iran can end this definitively by negotiating and meeting U.S. demands, but its decisionmaking will likely hinge on whether doing so will preserve the regime—the paramount goal—or set it on a path toward replacement.

Dr. Howard J. Shatz is a Senior Economist at RAND and a Professor of Policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.

Externally imposed regime change is not viable

Dr. Melani Cammett, Harvard University

The recent “12-day war” initiated by Israeli attacks on Iran represent a key instantiation of the larger remaking of the regional order in the Middle East. The most proximate cause of radical shifts in the regional balance of power were kicked off by Israeli responses to the October 7th Hamas attacks, which sparked an unprecedented wave of Israeli violence of Gaza, intensified settler attacks on and displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank, renewed violence between Israel and the “resistance” forces in Lebanon that wiped out key capabilities of Hezbollah and Lebanese politics, among other changes.

To be sure, the roots of these developments pre-date October 7, 2023. The October 7th massacre led to the largest loss of Israeli life in the country’s history and unleashed an unprecedented Israeli military response, but they were part of a much longer history of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. More recently, the 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries and the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia signaled important shifts in regional politics.

Nonetheless, in the past year, Israel’s actions have reshaped the Middle East in once unthinkable ways. The weakening of Iranian influence and power as a result of Israeli attacks degraded pro-Iran militias in the region and delayed if not destroyed elements of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In Syria, a coalition of Islamist militias led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which was headed by the current president of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, ousted the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad. Thus far, the new Syrian government has failed to consolidate control over the whole national territory and “ethnic entrepreneurs” are trying to reignite violence through blatantly sectarian violent attacks on minorities. Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike Syria at the slightest sign of perceived threats and illicit arms and drugs continue to flow across the Lebanese border.

During a recent trip to Lebanon, I saw firsthand how these changes in the regional order have reshaped politics and social relations in that country. With the degrading of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and human capital, the group’s domestic political opponents are emboldened, and a technocratic government is in charge under the leadership of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. The new government faces major challenges and may only remain in power for one year with the next national elections scheduled for May 2026. Critics of the current government, including from sympathizers, contend that it lacks direction and has failed to take decisive actions, particularly on pressing issues such as the question of how to distribute the losses of the failure of the banking sector. During conversations with citizens in the South, where the brunt of Israeli attacks has been felt, people are deeply divided over the recent war, with some blaming Israel and others holding Hezbollah responsible for involving Lebanon in Israel’s war on Gaza. Beneath the surface, political and social tensions from the 15-year civil war clearly remain unresolved.

President Trump has touted his peacemaking credentials in brokering the ceasefire between Iran and Israel, which has thus far held. Ultimately, military action and immediate ceasefire agreements will not resolve ongoing conflicts between Israel and its neighbors – whether with Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, or any other country in the region. To reach a more stable equilibrium, the US will need to sign a nuclear accord with Iran that will likely include many elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump abrogated during his first term. The experience of post-2003 Iraq and other examples demonstrate that externally imposed regime change is not viable and attacks on states with nuclear ambitions may incentivize them to double down on their plans to pursue nuclear weapons.

Dr. Melani Cammett is the Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs in the Department of Government and Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

The Iranian regime may continue to deteriorate

Dr. Mohammed A. Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran has ended, but its consequences for the region will reverberate for years. The most significant outcome is that Tehran is no longer capable of projecting power across the region, from its borders to the Levant and the Gulf. Iran has been militarily weakened in ways unforeseen until a couple of years ago.

While Israel, Iran, and the United States each claimed some measure of victory, the conflict marked a historic break in regional norms: Iran came under direct military attack by another regional state for the first time in nearly four decades (and the end of its war with Iraq). The U.S. further escalated the situation by bombing key Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Isfahan, and Natanz, another dramatic development signaling a willingness to target Iran's nuclear infrastructure militarily.

Israel's campaign struck deep into Iran's military (and related industrial) infrastructure, moving beyond previous tit-for-tat exchanges involving regional proxies. This marked the full implementation of Israel's "octopus doctrine," which targets not just Iran's proxies but the regime's core leadership and military assets on its soil. The message: Iran's perceived impunity has ended (though we witnessed some modest versions of that last year in April and October as well).

Despite a U.S.-brokered ceasefire now in place, if Israel’s ceasefires with Hamas and Hezbollah are any guide, it is unlikely to halt future strikes against what it views as direct threats from Iran, especially its missile and nuclear programs.

The Iranian regime has, however, survived—a feat that was uncertain just days ago. For a government beset by deep unpopularity, recurring internal unrest, and over a year of sustained Israeli pressure, survival itself is a form of victory. Yet, internally, the regime's ideological and governance legitimacy—challenged by Iranians since 2017 through protests against the hijab as its most visible symbol and over economic mismanagement—has come under sustained pressure. Externally, Iran’s regional expansionism has been in dramatic retreat, with its proxies weakened and the Assad regime in Syria toppled. Tehran is not in a strong position, raising serious questions about how long it can ultimately survive intact.

Looking forward, Iran faces multiple possible futures. It could continue to deteriorate, like Saddam Hussein's regime post-1991 or Syria post-2011. If it acquires a nuclear weapon, the regime may persist in isolation as a pariah state. Alternatively, regime transformation could occur through a coup led by pragmatist officers aiming to reset ties with the West and Israel. Others scenarios include regime change as a result of a popular uprising, or total collapse triggered by drawn-out foreign military action, such as renewed conflict with Israel.

For Kurds, this shift presents both risks and openings.

A weakened Iranian regime might intensify repression against Kurds and other ethnic groups in the country, who have led protest movements since 2019 and remain a potent internal challenge. Iran executed three Kurds on June 25 accused of spying for Israel—a warning sign of what could come.

Yet, under President Masoud Pezeshkian, there have been signs of a softer tone toward Kurds. This means Iran could choose a path of partial accommodation, granting ethnic minorities more cultural rights and administrative roles. Given that ethnic minorities make up around half of Iran’s population, this could mark a meaningful shift.

Either way, the war has ushered in a new era. Iran’s power projection has been curtailed, and its internal and regional dynamics are shifting. For the Kurds and other marginalized communities, the future is uncertain—but it is no longer static.

Dr. Mohammed A. Salih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program. He has two decades of experiences writing on Iraqi, Kurdish, and regional affairs in various capacities as a journalist, analyst and scholar.

A new regional strategy is essential to protect energy flows

Dr. Idrees Mohammed, American University of Kurdistan

The conflict between Israel and Iran raised serious concerns over global energy security. Each day, vast quantities of oil and gas flow through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy markets. As the war escalated—especially following U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—alarm was sounded over the possibility of disrupted shipments through the strait. Although the strait was not ultimately closed, the continued risk of such a scenario underscores the urgent need to reconsider how global energy security is structured.

Maritime chokepoints play a central role in the global energy system. These narrow passages link major bodies of water, allowing for the transport of oil and gas. While they are crucial for maintaining the flow of energy, chokepoints come with inherent risks. The fact that vessels must slow down to safely navigate these narrow waters makes them susceptible to threats such as piracy or terrorist attacks. More critically, their physical vulnerability means any closure or disruption can have immediate and far-reaching consequences for countries that rely on them.

The latest war in the Middle East brought these dangers back into focus. From the outset of the Israel-Iran conflict, experts and policymakers alike feared that the Strait of Hormuz might become a target. A major concern was that the conflict could spill over into the wider region, especially if the United States deepened its military involvement. When American forces struck three Iranian nuclear sites, those fears intensified. It raised the likelihood of Iranian retaliation—either through its regional proxies or direct action against U.S. interests—and increased speculation that Iran might try to close or disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials had, in fact, repeatedly warned that their forces could take action at this critical chokepoint.

The Strait of Hormuz is vital to both energy-producing and energy-consuming nations. Middle Eastern exporters rely on it to deliver oil and gas to global markets, while major importers—particularly in Asia—depend on it to meet their energy demands. As a result, a closure would have devastating consequences for both suppliers and consumers. It would also severely disrupt global energy security, the international economy, and regional stability. Given these stakes, any threat to the Strait would likely draw in major powers, further militarizing energy security and destabilizing an already fragile region.

Reliance on chokepoints by both suppliers and consumers poses significant risks. While avoiding them entirely is difficult, reducing this dependence is both feasible and desirable. One key strategy in the pursuit of energy security is diversification. When it comes to transport routes, countries can develop alternatives to chokepoints, such as building and utilizing oil and gas pipelines. While pipelines also create certain dependencies, they nonetheless offer a form of route diversification, enabling countries to rely on more than one pathway to transport energy.

A promising route diversification strategy for Middle Eastern producers involves looking northward. Strategically situated between energy-rich regions and high-demand markets, Turkey is well-positioned to serve as an energy hub. Since Europe lacks sufficient domestic energy resources, it has long relied on external suppliers—chief among them, Russia. However, the war in Ukraine has disrupted this dynamic, pushing European nations to explore alternative sources. In the early 2000s, European policies began identifying the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions as viable alternatives. Azerbaijan’s gas, for example, now reaches Europe via a pipeline that crosses Turkish territory.

In addition to pipeline connectivity with Europe, Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean enables sea-based transport of energy resources to global markets. Thus, Turkey offers a dual advantage for Middle Eastern energy exporters: a gateway to Europe via pipelines and to broader markets via sea routes.

The key issue then becomes identifying a viable land corridor between Turkey and the rest of the Middle East. In theory, both Syria and Iraq can provide this link. Syria, however, remains a highly unstable country. Although a new government has recently taken power, it faces the immense challenge of rebuilding institutions and restoring national unity—a process likely to take years. Iraq, while also struggling with governance issues, presents a relatively more viable option. Turkey and Iraq (including the Kurdistan Region) already have existing energy ties. Moreover, Iraq has expressed ambitions to serve as a bridge between Asian and European markets, including plans that bypass the Suez Canal. These trade initiatives could be extended to include oil and gas pipelines, linking Middle Eastern energy producers to global markets via Turkey.

This perspective places the Kurdistan Region at the center of energy geopolitics. Bordering Turkey to the south, the region offers a natural corridor for trade and pipelines between Iraq, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. Any attempt by Baghdad to circumvent the Kurdistan Region would complicate project implementation. Geography alone suggests that the region is indispensable as a strategic link—making it a key player in global energy security.

This reconfiguration of regional energy logistics will provoke mixed reactions. Turkey is likely to support the movement of energy resources across its territory. Iran, however, will resist any pipelines running through Iraq—especially those intended to transport gas from the Middle East to Europe—as it views them as competition to its own export ambitions. Russia, too, may oppose such developments, fearing a loss of influence in its traditional European markets. If excluded from the project, both nations may work to undermine it.

Conversely, the United States would likely back pipeline extensions from the Middle East to Turkey if they align with its strategic interests. Such projects would counterbalance Russian and Iranian influence and bolster European energy security. Europe, being the primary beneficiary, would naturally support initiatives that expand its access to diversified energy sources.

Among supplying countries, there may be divisions—driven by the strategic significance of the project and the geopolitical calculations it entails. Nevertheless, for the sake of global energy stability, both suppliers and consumers must reevaluate their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. A new regional strategy is essential to protect energy flows and promote long-term security.

Dr. Idrees Mohammed is a Lecturer at the American University of Kurdistan and the author of several books and studies on Iraq, regional security and energy security.