Iran-Israel Conflict : Experts React

Be Careful What You Wish For: The Dangerous Polarisation of Iran

Dr. Christine Cheng, King's College London

Israel’s recent strikes on Iran have deepened domestic divisions of a country already strained by authoritarianism, economic crisis, and popular discontent. What we are witnessing now is a widening and hardening of these divisions, with unpredictable consequences not just for Iran’s future but for the stability of the entire Middle East.

For regime loyalists—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, clerics, and those benefiting from state patronage—the strikes have provoked outrage and calls for revenge. The government has seized the moment to stage mass rallies and mobilise nationalist sentiment, invoking familiar narratives of martyrdom and Zionist aggression.

But there has also been a very different response from those who have been suppressed by the regime. In some quarters, there has been muted relief, even joy. Online videos have even shown ordinary Iranians dancing and celebrating as missiles rain down around them.

In the Iranian context—where expressions of defiance can lead to disappearance, torture, and killing—this moment should not be interpreted as garden-variety dissent. It reflects a deeper emotional rupture with the nation-state. When regular people are cheering the deaths of their own military leaders at the hands of a despised enemy, the social contract is not just broken— it has been torn to pieces. This split— between regime loyalists and opposition voices— has not only been widening, it has also been hardening. The middle ground—where moderate reformists and quiet critics could once operate —is being stamped out by polarisation and fear.

This polarisation is not new but it is accelerating. The regime, facing this erosion of legitimacy, could easily resort to silencing anyone who shows disloyalty — as it has done before. Such a crackdown will succeed in the short term, but it will make the regime more brittle, with greater reliance on fear, not legitimacy, in order to rule.

For those outside the region, especially in Western capitals, this moment looks like an opportunity: a brittle regime under pressure, its legitimacy collapsing, its opponents emboldened. It is conceivable that external strikes, combined with internal division, will bring about the fall of this regime. But as we’ve seen in Egypt, Sudan, and Libya, fragmentation does not necessarily lead to democratic renewal. Weakening Khamenei’s grip on power could just as easily usher in something more violent, unstable, and regionally corrosive.

The implications extend far beyond Iran’s borders. Historically, when it has been under pressure, the IRGC responds by activating its proxy networks in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen in order to project strength at home. Doing so reminds rival factions in Tehran of the IRGC’s importance while also signalling to both domestic and foreign adversaries that Iran can still retaliate via its proxies. But this external escalation increases the risk of regional spillover, miscalculation, and direct confrontation with Israel or the United States. It will also endanger the delicate relationship between Iran and Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Western policymakers must resist the temptation to see instability as a strategic gain. Even if the Ayatollah’s regime collapses, it is unlikely that what follows will be a stable democracy. The weakening of the regime could spur infighting amongst political elites, fragmentation of the security forces, or an outright revolution. As we have seen in other Middle Eastern countries, any “victory” against the regime could spark years of regional fallout.

Strikes on Iran may serve short-term strategic goals, but the path is fraught with danger. Iran is cracking, and what comes next is far from certain. But Western policymakers must avoid mistaking instability for progress. Once a war begins, conflict dynamics often take on a life of their own. An Iranian regime under siege may lash out, collapse inward, or turn even more brutal. At that point, external pressure risks triggering a transformation that no one can control—and that many across the region will come to regret.

Dr Christine Cheng is Senior Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. At King’s, Dr Cheng teaches on the MA in Conflict, Security, and Development. Previously, she was the Boskey Fellow in Politics at Exeter College, Oxford, and the Cadieux-Léger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada. She has worked for the UN and the World Bank. Dr Cheng holds a DPhil from the University of Oxford (Nuffield) and an MPA from Princeton University.

A Test for Global Powers and Regional Stability

Francesco Salesio Schiavi, Middle East Institute of Switzerland

Israel’s pre-emptive campaign has thrown the Middle East into a new phase of open interstate war, reviving fears of nuclear proliferation and regional conflagration at a time when global powers appear both overcommitted and divided. For Israel, this war is about buying time — crippling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, assassinating key figures, and banking on internal decay to weaken the Islamic Republic from within. Yet this logic ignores the regime’s resilience: far from toppling easily, it may consolidate around nationalism and escalate its pursuit of a bomb, turning today’s pre-emptive strikes into tomorrow’s arms race.

For Gulf neighbours, the consequences are immediate: disrupted energy flows, threats to maritime chokepoints, and the nightmare scenario of Iranian proxies lashing out across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Red Sea. Arab partners often act through quiet mediation channels, like Oman and Qatar, which have credibility with Iran and Western capitals alike. So, regional players prefer containment and de-escalation to outright confrontation. Many Arab capitals see both Israel and Iran locked in a destructive contest they cannot contain, yet fear a deeper U.S. entanglement would drag the region back into decades of foreign interventions.

Europe remain marginal but not passive. European states — Britain, France, and Germany on the lead — are reactivating the old “E3” diplomatic format, meeting Iran’s foreign minister in Geneva tomorrow, June 20, to seek monitoring guarantees and a missile restraint pledge. If anything, they have a renewed chance to champion quiet diplomacy and non-proliferation, encouraging credible inspections and realistic off-ramps. But credibility demands alignment with Washington — a perennial weakness when the White House oscillates between maximalist threats and back-channel overtures.

Russia, once central to nuclear negotiations, watches this escalation with mixed motives. The Kremlin has no appetite — nor capacity — to shield Iran militarily but welcomes a diverted West and elevated oil prices that feed its war economy in Ukraine. At the same time, a regime collapse in Tehran could jeopardize Russia’s hard-won leverage and shared projects like the North-South Corridor. Moscow’s symbolic mediation overtures are less about solving the crisis than positioning itself as an indispensable broker — if the US or Iran ever seek a back channel.

China’s dilemma is equally stark. Beijing’s economic footprint in the Gulf is vast, yet its political influence is shallow when missiles fly. The escalation has undercut China’s narrative as a stable, development-first partner and exposed the limits of its ‘win-win’ diplomacy when raw hard power dictates outcomes. Beijing’s calls for restraint and offers to ‘constructively engage’ ring hollow to both Israeli and Iranian audiences preoccupied with survival and deterrence. More critically, a drawn-out conflict threatens China’s energy security and could erode its credibility as an alternative to Western crisis management, particularly among the Global South.

President Trump’s next moves are decisive. While Israel seeks U.S. munitions and perhaps direct strikes on Iran’s deepest bunkers in Fordow, full American entry risks a cascade of retaliatory attacks, oil market shocks, and the unsettling possibility that China — as Iran’s chief economic lifeline — will emerge as the last bridge to Tehran.

Ultimately, Israel can destroy facilities but not know-how; Iran can retaliate but not win decisively; regional players can urge restraint but lack leverage. Only a hard-headed balance of pressure and diplomacy stands a chance of freezing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and preventing the conflict from calcifying into endless cycles of raids and retaliation. For Europe, the Gulf, and the United States alike, the priority must be containing escalation before today’s gamble becomes tomorrow’s quagmire.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an independent Middle East analyst and consultant specialized in the international relations and security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf. His expertise includes military and diplomatic interventions by international actors in the MENA region, as well as in military technologies of some of the leading Middle Eastern actors in this sector. He is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS).

The Islamic Republic is Cornered—But Its Grip on Power Remains Firm, For Now

Armin Seif, Europe-Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Oxford University

The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing one of the most precarious moments in its modern history. The United States’ direct military intervention alongside Israel has stripped away much of Tehran’s strategic leverage and shattered long-held illusions of invulnerability. But while Iran’s leadership finds itself increasingly isolated and under pressure, its hold on power inside the country remains firm—for now.

The recent U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan have dealt a devastating blow to the regime’s core bargaining chip: its nuclear program. For decades, Iran has used nuclear brinkmanship to extract diplomatic concessions and project power far beyond its conventional means. That playbook is no longer viable.

Iran’s broader regional position is also deteriorating. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the weakening of Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the exposure of critical limitations within Iran’s missile capabilities have collectively cornered the Islamic Republic. The perception of Iran as a formidable regional actor is rapidly eroding.

In response to U.S. strikes, the IRGC’s leadership—reshuffled after Israeli operations eliminated senior decision-makers—attempted controlled retaliation by firing missiles at the U.S. base in Qatar. But this action reflects the regime’s shrinking room for maneuver, not renewed strength. Tehran appears to be relying on calibrated signaling to project resilience while avoiding outright escalation, as the environment has fundamentally changed. The Trump administration has demonstrated its willingness to engage militarily should Iranian provocations exceed Washington’s tolerance threshold.

The recently paused Israeli strikes inside Iran would also likely resume if new provocations emerge from Tehran, potentially expanding Israel’s goals beyond the original strategic objectives: the elimination of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has framed regime change as a possible byproduct of Operation Rising Lion, President Trump has briefly entertained the prospect before publicly downplaying it—nonetheless introducing an added layer of unpredictability to an already volatile conflict.

Diplomatically, Tehran has never been more isolated. Europe’s traditional policy of cautious engagement—often indistinguishable from appeasement—has crumbled. Germany under Chancellor Merz has hardened its stance, while the United Kingdom has reaffirmed its commitment to the U.S. special relationship. European leaders, though primarily focused on preventing terrorism, energy disruptions, and refugee crises, are increasingly sidelined by fast-moving and unpredictable military developments.

Even Iran’s long-standing partners are recalibrating. Qatar, despite deep economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran, now finds itself exposed, as demonstrated when Iranian missiles struck a U.S. base on Qatari soil. Moscow and Beijing continue to publicly criticize U.S. military actions, yet remain unwilling to extend meaningful military support to Tehran. Their primary interest is preserving the survival of the Islamic Republic—but firmly without allowing Iran to develop nuclear military capabilities that could further destabilize the region.

Inside Iran, the regime’s grip on power remains formidable, but cracks are visible. The Islamic Republic has spent decades building an extensive internal security apparatus capable of suppressing dissent through repression, surveillance, and violence. Yet, recent breaches—exposing the presence of Israeli intelligence networks and drone operations on Iranian soil—have heightened paranoia within the regime’s leadership and revealed weaknesses once considered inconceivable.

Still, history warns against underestimating authoritarian systems. The Islamic Republic has always been a master of survival, often appearing strategically irrational but rarely making tactical errors. That combination has allowed the regime to weather existential crises before.

But this time, the level of uncertainty is unprecedented. Israel appears willing to pursue its strategic objectives by all available means. The question of regime change, while once taboo, is now openly discussed in both Jerusalem and Washington. Whether this is the beginning of a prolonged contest or the precursor to rapid internal collapse remains unclear. The sudden fall of Assad’s regime in Syria is a reminder of how quickly authoritarian structures can unravel, potentially triggering chaos far beyond national borders.

The Islamic Republic is weakened, isolated, and under immense external and internal pressure. Its grip on power remains firm—for now. But the international community must prepare for all possible outcomes, including sudden regime collapse, to avoid a destabilizing vacuum that could engulf the entire region.

Armin Seif is the Director of the Europe-Middle East Council on Global Affairs and a Senior Specialist at the German Red Cross. He specialises in governance and the rule of law in fragile states. He is currently researching the implications of artifical intelligence in fragile states at Oxford University and has conducted research at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the University of Cambridge, Oxford University’s Saïd Business School and the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (Biicl), Armin was a member of several research teams on legal reform in the Islamic world with a particular focus on post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Role of Regional Actors Will Be Decisive

Dr. Abdullah Baabood, Waseda University

The Israeli attack on Iran and the rapidly escalating conflict between the two sides mark a dangerous inflection point in Middle Eastern geopolitics, with serious implications for regional stability and global security. What began as a contained exchange has expanded into missile strikes, sabotage of critical infrastructure, and growing U.S. involvement—raising the threat of a broader regional war. Proxy actors across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are mobilizing, and the risk of multi-front escalation is now greater than at any time in recent memory. Arab Gulf states, in particular, are caught in a delicate balancing act-between strategic restraint, alignment pressures, and the imperative of self-preservation.

The immediate fallout is multidimensional. Economically, heightened fears of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz have already driven oil prices sharply higher, with potential ripple effects for global energy markets. Politically, regional governments are alarmed that a wider conflict could stoke internal unrest, derail development agendas, radicalize populations, and empower non-state actors. The humanitarian consequences—especially if the conflict spills into Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, or the Gulf—could be devastating.

Despite the gravity of the situation, there remain narrow but critical opportunities for de-escalation. Oman and Qatar, long respected for their neutrality and diplomatic agility, are well positioned to mediate between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv. Regional stakeholders must urgently push for a multilateral diplomatic track that incorporates confidence-building measures, non-aggression assurances, and discreet backchannel diplomacy.

Reviving the JCPOA-or negotiating a new framework-could offer a structured off-ramp, especially if the United States shows flexibility on sanctions in exchange for verifiable Iranian restraint. The role of regional actors will be decisive. Rather than falling into rigid camps, Gulf and wider regional states must collectively advocate for restraint and work to contain the conflict. Iran and its allies will likewise determine whether the confrontation remains bilateral or spirals into a region-wide conflagration.

This confrontation also intersects with great power rivalry. The United States faces a strategic dilemma: how to back Israel while avoiding deeper entanglement. Meanwhile, China and Russia are leveraging the crisis to position themselves as more neutral brokers of stability, challenging Western dominance. The Israel–Iran escalation is no longer merely a regional flashpoint-it is a defining test of global diplomacy and the evolving international order in a post-American Middle East.

Dr. Abdullah Baabood is an academic from Oman who currently holds the Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies and a visiting professor at the Faculty of International Research and Education, Waseda University, Tokyo-Japan. Abdullah taught at different universities and institutions in Europe and the Gulf, and was a visiting professor at the Middle Institute, National University of Singapore and the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar.

The Ring of Fire Strategy Must not be Neglected

Dr. Yainv Voller, Kent University

One of Iran’s main strategies for expanding its influence in the region and challenging its rivals, whether Israel or the Saudi-Emirati axis, has been the use of regional proxies. This “ring of fire” strategy, has involved the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Northwestern Yemen, and the various Shi‘a paramilitaries in Iraq, leading among them Kata’ib Hezbollah. Through supporting these actors militarily and politically, Iran had sought to deter Israel (and the United States) from launching a pre-emptive strike by threatening to unleash these groups’ massive Iranian-provided firepower on targets in Israel and the Gulf. It also used its ties to these groups to increase its influence on the politics of their countries.

The blows Israel landed on Hezbollah in October 2024 and the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which served as a corridor between Iran and Lebanon, led observers to argue that this strategy has failed. Indeed, at least during the war’s first days, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi paramilitaries refrained from intervening in the conflict, at least in its first days.

However, one must be cautious about declaring the ring of fire’s demise. For many years, this doctrine and the firepower possessed by Hezbollah and the Houthis caused significant concerns among Israeli policymakers and forced the Saudisand Emiratis to withdraw from their intervention in Yemen. It was Israel’s neutralizing of Hezbollah during the Gaza War that created the domino effect leading to the collapse of the ring of fire doctrine.

Nonetheless, it is essential to bear in mind that the rationale for proxy warfare and the basic infrastructure have not vanished. If Israel (with American support) is successful in destroying, or even delaying, the Iranian nuclear program Iran’s motivation for reviving the doctrine will only increase. True, the decapitation of the IRGC’s top leadership has caused the loss of significant experience and contacts with the proxies. Nonetheless, the knowledge is not entirely lost, and Tehran would have an even stronger motivation to renew its deterrence in this fashion.

To prevent the resurrection of the ring of fire doctrine, any negotiations leading to de-escalation must include constraints to Iran’s ability to meddle in the affairs of neighboring states and renew support for its proxies. While the priority is to guarantee the eradication of Iran’s nuclear program, overlooking Iran’s eagerness to create chaos and instability in the region in other ways must still be addressed.

Dr. Yaniv Voller is a Senior Lecturer at Kent University and specialises in the international and comparative politics of the Middle East and North Africa, sovereignty, separatist violence, civil wars, diaspora politics, and, more recently, the changing nature of armed forces and their social and political roles.