Europe Must Embrace Strategic Support in Libya

Andrea Cellino, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Europe must urgently rethink its approach to Libya—not merely to stabilize, but to strategically support the UN-led process in a country at risk of collapse. As UN SRSG Hanna Tetteh recently stressed, international backing is essential to any political breakthrough. With Libya’s institutions fragmented, armed groups entrenched in the economy, and Russia deepening its foothold, the latest UN report makes clear that European unity and action are vital—not only for Libya’s future, but for the security of the wider region.

Recent clashes in Tripoli following the May 12 killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (aka “Ghaniwa”) head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia have re-ignited conflicts between rival factions in the Libyan capital. Accused of assassinations, torture, and other human rights violations, al-Kikli controlled the important Tripoli neighbourhood of Abu Selim, and his killing stemmed from internal rivalries between militias in the control apparatus of the Government of National Unity (GNU) of prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Now, the situation appears to be back under (precarious) control of the government in Tripoli. But reports of movements of other armed groups outside the capital, from Zawiya and the east controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, have presaged the outbreak of a wider conflict.

On 17 April, UN Special Representative Tetteh briefed the Security Council on Libya, emphasizing the indispensable role of regional and international support in securing a political agreement. Ms. Tetteh stated that “The support of regional and international partners is crucial to the success of any political agreement” in Libya, briefing the Security Council on the situation in Libya. The latest report on Libya by the UN SG ( S/2025/223 ) in fact highlighted persistent critical issues that constitute compelling reasons for European countries to recalibrate their approach to Libya away from a stabilisation focus, but rather more overtly supportive of the UN’s strategy.

The SG report emphasizes that “the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united, stable and democratic country remain unfulfilled”, despite over a dozen years of UN efforts towards peace. The document strongly – but diplomatically - criticised the Libyan authorities, and particularly the country’s two split executive branches, for perpetuating institutional divisions and entrenched political divisions, thus undermining good governance and favouring instability.  

In a tense political landscape where competition for territorial control still remains a daily affair for armed factions, the SG reaffirms the most recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, stressing that the influence of armed groups “affected the ability of State institutions to implement their mandates”. Among the main governance concerns, the economic situation is at the centre of the UN preoccupations, notably in the aftermath of the forced takeover of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) in 2024. Despite rising oil production, the Libyan economy is still reeling from the takeover of the CBL and the wave of international temporary sanctions that ensued.

The country’s lack of stability continues to impact exchange rates (formal and informal), affecting livelihoods. Libya is a rentier state, depending entirely on oil revenues, yet the report highlights that more and more oil is being illegally smuggled by armed factions and thus not going into state coffers.

There is of course a direct link between the near economic collapse and the role of the armed groups, which are ever more embedded in Libya’s energy economy.  Armed groups dominate key economic zones, including oil facilities, smuggling hubs, and border crossings (e.g., Zawiyah, Ghadamis basin) and profit from fuel smuggling and protection rackets, diverting state resources. The UN reports document how armed factions operate in the informal economy, particularly in Tripoli, Misrata, and western cities, exploiting fuel subsidies and customs revenue. Similarly, the Libyan Arab armed forces (LAAF) and other armed groups loyal to Haftar, through control of key border crossings, oil terminals, and smuggling corridors in the east and the south, profit from trafficking and illicit economic activities.

Furthermore, the recent SG report provides information about illegal migration and human trafficking, including human rights violations against migrants, which are conducted by Libyan armed groups—both in the West (Tripoli-based) and the East (Haftar-aligned)—with the direct and indirect complicity of state authorities. As detailed previously, whilst Libyan leaders implicated in crime earn much more from fuel, drug and weapons smuggling than from migrant trafficking, they have a political interest in favouring the demands of European governments on migration issues in exchange for "prestige" and recognition. A strategy which helps them maintain legitimacy through political validation.

In addition to the challenges that a lawless, unstable and ill-governed country like Libya represents for the security of Europe and the entire Mediterranean, recent international developments make a strategy by EU countries to address them even more urgent. Russia, which has been present in Libya for years both diplomatically and with its PMCs proxies the Wagner Group (rebranded as Africa Corps), has now successfully operated a partial strategic pivot relocating troops and hardware from Syria to Libya. Allegedly, Russia’s mercenaries have also been involved in illicit activities in Libya, such as drug smuggling and mineral extraction. Through a deepened political, military, and economic footprint in Libya, primarily through its alignment with Haftar’s eastern authorities and its associates, Moscow aims to achieve its broader strategic goals in Africa, including military access, energy influence, and regional leverage against the West.

Therefore, in response to the call for international support by UN SRSG Tetteh, EU members should take decisive steps to strengthen UNSMIL efforts to advance elections, stabilize the economy, protect human rights, and address humanitarian and migration crises. Coordinated European engagement not only would be crucial to sustaining stability, end lawlessness, and supporting Libyan-led solutions, but to counter Russia’s strategy to the continent’s south.

The current US administration’s “strategic ambiguity” toward Russia and its incoherent approach to Libya, may indicate that Europe must rely on its means to deal with Moscow’s aggressive expansionism, not only on the European continent. In addition, the Trump administration’s plans to send illegal migrants to Libya, most likely to Benghazi, would exacerbate human rights violations and favour politically-linked criminal groups, further destabilizing the country.

European counterstrategies presuppose that individual EU members abandon their competing interests in Libya, which have long weakened international determination to stabilize the country. In addition to decisively supporting UNSMIL's efforts to advance elections, stabilize the economy, protect human rights, and address humanitarian and migration crises, the EU should provide supplementary diplomatic leadership, financial investment, and targeted technical support. To counter Russia’s influence, EU members must also provide credible and sustainable alternatives. Economically, the EU should expand technical assistance to Libya's Central Bank, Audit Bureau, and Ministry of Finance to support budget unification and anti-corruption reforms.

Other measures may include facilitating regional economic dialogues to integrate Libya into Mediterranean trade and investment frameworks. In the security sector, the EU should enhance coordination among Libyan security actors, providing reinforced security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategies toward institutional unification.

On migration, despite the difficulties of the current European political climate, solutions would be provided by expanding safe and legal pathways for asylum seekers, including humanitarian corridors and resettlement schemes. Seriously dismantling human trafficking networks and support the development of community-based protection mechanisms would necessarily mean avoiding deals with leaders and politicians profiting from human traffic, as well as providing support to unrestricted UN and NGO access to all detention facilities.

Weakening Russia’s role in Libya should involve, for instance,expandingOperation IRINI, the EU naval mission that enforces the UN arms embargo on Libya; countering illegal arms flows (many of which are linked to Russian interests), and boosting intelligence sharing and surveillance of Russian mercenary activities. Launching initiatives to counter Russian disinformation and support Libyan civil society and media organizations will counter narratives pushed by Russian media in Libya. Such actions may find support from NATO, or selected Alliance members. They would also benefit from revised EU regional strategies, rebuilding or reinforcing partnerships with Libya’s North African neighbours like Algeria and Egypt, and cooperating with other important and involved actors, such as Turkey and the UAE.

Andrea Cellino is Vice President of the Middle East Institute Switzerland (MEIS), and Executive-In-Residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).