The War with Iran: Experts React

Can a Massive Military Campaign From the Air Enable Regime Change?

Sir John Jenkins, Former UK Ambassador to Iraq and Saudi Arabia

Whatever the genesis of the US–Israeli air (and now naval) campaign, it is certainly a major turning point for the region. Iran has been problematic for its neighbours in very different ways for over 70 years. The Shah was never a comfortable presence for them: he saw Iran as the natural regional hegemon and wanted to prove it in the waters of the Gulf—as we saw during the Bahrain crisis and the seizure of the Tunbs and Abu Musa in 1970–71.

The Islamist regime that took power after the 1979 revolution was, of course, far worse, seeking to export revolution and sponsoring subversion. And its pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme (which no one except the regime’s apologists seriously doubts) became a chronic problem for the GCC in particular. It remained so even after the signature of the JCPOA in 2015, not least because the agreement contained an array of sunset clauses, international controls on Iran’s ballistic missile programme were relaxed, and there was, in practice, no follow-up plan.

In addition, Iran’s sponsorship of a network of armed regional sub-state actors—Lebanese Hizbollah, a range of Iraqi Shia militias, the Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas—undermined state authority in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen and (together with Israeli actions) maintained a constant state of tension in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).

Will Trump’s campaign make all this better? Iran and its allies had already been hit very hard during last summer’s 12-day war with Israel—and, latterly, the US. And there has been a huge amount of further damage done to Iran’s nuclear sites, its air defence, its missile stocks and storage, fuelling and launch sites—and, of course, to the leadership of the country and of the IRGC.

As it still retains the power to coerce, the regime may well be able to maintain its hold on the country, a majority of whose population probably wish it would vanish. It remains to be seen, too, whether there is some sort of rally-round-the-flag reaction, as there was, for a time, last year. But the core problems in Iran—the sheer scale of economic mismanagement, the massive environmental degradation, the water shortages, and the corruption and theft of public resources—are all about the malign incompetence of the mercantile clerico-military establishment. You can’t solve that from 15,000 feet.

So the question is: can even the most massive military campaign open a space for serious change eventually to take place? Trump is presumably hoping that it can—even if only in the shape of the Venezuela option. But even that much is unclear: in closing off effective space for proper opposition, the regime has at least been successful. In the meantime, the campaign has forced regional states to pick a side—something they hoped to avoid. And that in itself will have repercussions far beyond the end of this campaign.

Sir John Jenkins is a former senior British diplomat and the Middle East Strand Leader at Cambridge University’s Centre for Geopolitics. In a 35-year career, he served as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Burma, Consul-General in Jerusalem, and as the British Special Representative to the National Transitional Council and later Ambassador to Libya during the 2011 revolution.

The Potential Survival of the Islands of Stability

Dr. Yaniv Voller, Royal United Services Institute

On the surface, the Iran war appears to have shaken one of the most common perceptions of the region: the idea that certain states or actors are “islands of stability.” For years, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain were widely seen as among the safest and most hospitable countries in the Middle East—a haven for global talent to come, contribute to their booming economies, and enjoy a luxurious lifestyle unavailable even in some of the most prosperous economies in the West.

Iran’s near-simultaneous attack on these countries and other neighbours has led some to question the durability of this image. The level of violence these states have just experienced is unprecedented, and many foreign nationals, mainly Westerners, are now seeking repatriation flights, leaving behind the lives they had built in the Gulf.

However, it may be too soon to declare the end of the islands of stability. In fact, the current war, although undeniably traumatising, could yet prove a blessing in disguise—depending, of course, on its outcomes. Gulf states have learned that attempting to contain an aggressive disruptor such as the Islamic Republic is a poor long-term strategy. Drawing on their vast resources and their connections with the US and Israel, they may now look for new ways to protect their territory, people, and economies, and to develop more durable responses to future security threats.

New alliances, or the strengthening of existing ones, could restore the sense of security and confidence that has characterised these countries, helping them retain their appeal to global talent and investment. On this note, one island of stability that often does not receive the attention it deserves is the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. At least at the time of writing, evidence is mounting that Washington has been prompting the Kurdish leadership and the Peshmerga to facilitate the entry of Kurdish forces, primarily from the Kurdistan Region in Iran, to join the fighting. One should remain cautious about the prospects of any such move.

Given past experience, it is doubtful that the Kurdish leadership can, or should, fully trust guarantees or promises offered in return for supporting a campaign against the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, this is yet another indication of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s role as a pillar within the region’s evolving security architecture. This development, too, should make us slightly more optimistic about the prospects for the remaining islands of stability in the Middle East.

Dr, Yaniv Voller is a Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Kent and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He was previously a Fellow at the University of Edinburgh and was awarded his PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Second-Generation Liberation Wars: Rethinking Colonialism in Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Sudan (Cambridge University Press, 2022) and The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood (Routledge, 2014).

This War Will Redefine Defence Strategies of Gulf States

Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan, National University of Singapore

Given the scale of Iran’s sustained attacks on Gulf states, this war is likely to change the strategic culture of Arab monarchies in dramatic ways. At the diplomatic level, it brings to an end the illusion that Gulf capitals could cautiously maintain ties with Iran while still anchoring their security firmly in the US orbit. In retrospect, the push toward de-escalation that began in 2019 across the Arabian Peninsula and culminated in the Saudi–Iran deal of March 2023 now appears deeply flawed.

Furthermore, Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar, which long defined themselves as stable bubbles disconnected from the turbulence of the Middle East, will face a reckoning. To reassure foreign residents and investors, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha will need to rethink how they protect their territories. This challenge was already looming. Abu Dhabi was attacked in January 2022 by Houthi missiles and drones; Doha was bombed twice—by Iran and then Israel—in the year prior to this latest war.

When the war ends, the response from Gulf states will likely combine several measures. It is likely to drive a surge in procurement of air-defense systems across the region. If the UAE had not possessed Patriot and THAAD batteries, the damage caused by Iranian attacks could have been far worse. But other, less costly, actions will also be required.

Compared to Israel, Gulf cities lack robust early-warning policies; there is no comprehensive network of shelters across their territories, and residents do not have phone apps that notify them of incoming threats. Addressing these gaps will also require raising public awareness and normalising basic preparedness.

Taken together, this implies rethinking how Gulf citizens and residents live their daily lives, with the knowledge that sudden disruption and destruction is a real possibility. For some, that may feel like a grim bargain (and it will surely deter some expats), but over time it may also foster a new civic sentiment—one that ultimately amounts to resilience.

Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore. He was previously a policy advisor at the French Ministry of Defense, research advisor at the NATO Defense College and associate professor in strategic studies with the United Arab Emirates National Defense College.

Shia Militias’ Double Game and its Implications for the Iraqi state

Dr. Mohammed A. Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Iran-aligned militias in Iraq appear to be the tip of Iran’s spear in turning the Kurdistan Region of Iraq into a battlefield. In recent days, these factions have launched a wave of attacks against a wide range of targets: U.S. military and diplomatic facilities, Erbil International Airport, at least one hotel in Erbil, a former UN building in Sulaimaniyah, and offices belonging to Iranian Kurdish opposition parties based in the Kurdistan Region. These operations form part of a broader Iranian strategy to pressure both the United States and Kurdish actors simultaneously. In effect, Kurdistan has become one of the arenas through which Tehran wages a multi-front campaign against U.S. interests and Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.

Iran’s goal is clear: punish the Kurdistan Region for hosting U.S. forces while neutralising Iranian Kurdish opposition movements operating from its territory. The result is a sustained escalation that places Kurdistan—an entity not party to the regional conflict—directly in the line of fire.

The militias operate through a deliberate grey-zone strategy. When they carry out attacks, they claim responsibility as “resistance” factions, issuing statements in the name of the anti-U.S. “Islamic resistance.” But when they are targeted and killed by U.S. strikes, they suddenly become members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state institution formally integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus.

Since the PMF is officially part of Iraq’s security and defence structure, the implications are serious. If PMF members attack U.S. forces or international facilities, does that mean the Iraqi state itself is at war with the United States? Iran has long exploited this ambiguity. The grey-zone approach has allowed Tehran and its allied factions to strike adversaries while avoiding full state accountability. However, this double game has its limits, and it may backfire given the rising U.S. hostility toward these groups in recent months, alongside growing demands for their disarmament and dismantling.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government insists it is staying out of the regional conflict. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has said Iraqi territory will not be used for others’ wars. Yet the attacks continue. Iraqi officials claim they cannot confront these militias militarily, but the government still has options: publicly name the factions responsible, cut off their funding, expel them from the PMF, and possibly confiscate their weapons or halt further assistance—military or otherwise. Failing to take such steps effectively enables their actions.

The consequences are already visible. U.S. strikes have targeted militia strongholds in places like Babil, Anbar, and Diyala, killing several militants. The longer this grey-zone policy persists, the greater the risk that Iraq itself will be drawn deeper into a widening regional war.

Dr. Mohammed A. Saih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the National Security Program at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Kurdish affairs for two decades, contributing to various international media outlets, think tanks, and scholarly publications.